Water Track 8 7 15 051

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Information about Water Track 8 7 15 051

Published on November 7, 2007

Author: Mahugani

Source: authorstream.com

Slide1:  Mr. Michael X Clawson, PE, REM Headquarters Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency HQ AFCESA/CESC 10 August 2005 Water Track 8 Design Considerations for Drinking Water Security Overview:  Overview Types of Attack False assumptions about water system security Water System Security Design Features General Security Measures Source Water (Before Treatment) Treatment Plants Distribution System SCADA & Controls Contaminant detection Security Measure Selection Criteria Water Security Guidance Documents Types of Attacks:  Types of Attacks Physical damage to infrastructure Explosive or Arson Flammable liquid in system Vandalism or sabotage of valves, tanks, pipes, etc. Chemical agent that causes long-term contamination of the interior of pipes or storage tanks. Disruption of water service Introduction or threat of introduction of toxin Hacking in to SCADA or PLC systems Sabotage of valves tanks, etc Harming workers or public Release of toxic substances (i.e. chlorine gas) Explosive or arson Introduction of toxins False Assumptions About Water System Security:  False Assumptions About Water System Security Water system pressure provides security against contamination Water systems have sufficient redundancy Buried components are protected Dilution in water systems means large quantities of toxins are necessary Physical security alone can protect systems General Security Design Measures:  General Security Design Measures Redundancy, Redundancy, Redundancy Eliminate critical nodes or single points of failure Protect what you can’t eliminate Backup Power Systems Increase storage Reduce quantities or switch to less hazardous material Multiple sources of water and treatment Raw water sources Treated water sources Distributed treatment Increase Public/Law Enforcement Awareness Local Police Neighborhood Watch Program Slide6:  Source Water Source Water Vulnerabilities :  Source Water Vulnerabilities Water course contamination sources Chemical & fuel manufacturing bulk storage facilities Road & Railroad crossings Industrial impounds, mills, and mines Nuclear Facilities Wastewater Plants Intake structures Wellhead contamination Production, Monitoring, and Private Wells Piping Source Water Protection Measures:  Source Water Protection Measures General Measures Backup/Alternate source Intrusion detection systems Fencing Surface Water Restrict access near intakes Bank Filtration/infiltration galleries Wellhead security measures Wellhead protection plan Restrict access & activities in wellhead area Enclosed well houses with perimeter fence Secure monitoring wells Slide9:  Treatment Plants Treatment Plant Vulnerabilities:  Treatment Plant Vulnerabilities Treatment plants have numerous vulnerabilities Areas open to atmosphere Chemical injection points Hazardous material storage Treatment Plant Protection Measures:  Treatment Plant Protection Measures Where feasible, totally enclose treatment plant Provide multiple layers of security & fencing Intrusion Detection Electronic monitoring of critical control points (valves, pumps, equipment settings, HAZMAT, etc.) Reduce Hazardous Material Storage On-site Chlorine Generation JIT Delivery Treatment Plant Protection Measures:  Treatment Plant Protection Measures Membranes can provide a higher level of protection than conventional treatment for certain types of source water contamination Can provide positive barrier to some contaminants in source water Can be a tie-breaker when comparing membranes to conventional treatment Contaminants blocked depend on class of membrane Treatment Plant Protection Measures:  Treatment Plant Protection Measures Contaminants removed by various membrane classes Micro Filtration (0.1 to 1.0u pore size) Bacteria (>3 log removal) Some viruses (mostly those associated with particulates, typically 0.5 to 3 log virus removal ) Protozoa & Cysts( >6 log removal) Ultra Filtration - Above Plus Some high molecular weight dissolved organics (100,000 molecular weight cutoff typical) Viruses (up to 6 log removal) Nano Filtration –Above Plus Dissolved Organics, (e.g. humic acids, TOC) Pesticides & Some Synthetic Organic Chemicals (e.g. nerve agents, toxins) Divalent cations and anions (e.g. ammonia, and some nitrates, phosphates, & radiological) Treatment Plant Protection Measures:  Treatment Plant Protection Measures Contaminants removed by various membrane classes Reverse Osmosis – Above Plus Inorganic monovalent Ions (Na, K, etc.) Synthetic Organic Chemicals Radiological Nutrients (e.g. nitrates, phosphates) Specific contaminants removed, removal efficiencies, etc., will depend on specifics of toxin, the membrane, and the manufacturer Some types of contaminants can destroy a membrane Membranes will not prevent contamination of the distribution system Slide15:  Distribution Systems Distribution System Vulnerabilities:  Distribution System Vulnerabilities Smaller amount of contaminant needed Pump can be used to overcome system pressure and introduce contaminants Hydrants & Buildings Can target specific areas Destruction of key nodes can affect entire system Storage tanks at atmospheric pressure Pump houses Meters & Backflow preventors Distribution System Protection Measures:  Distribution System Protection Measures Prevent unauthorized access Fence, alarm, and secure critical components Use SCADA as security alarm system Develop hydraulic model Can be used to determine critical nodes Can predicted contaminant travel when injection point is known Unidirectional flushing plan can help restore system after contamination Many of the commercial hydraulic modeling software being sold are enhanced versions of EPANet 2.0 (Free Software) http://www.epa.gov/ORD/NRMRL/wswrd/epanet.html Some commercial models are GIS compatible Distribution System Protection Measures:  Distribution System Protection Measures Valves Secure and lock all valves Monitor critical valves with tamper switches Eliminate quick closing valves Tamper resistant fire hydrants Can prevent access and water theft Fire safety issues may limit their application Distribution System Protection Measures:  Distribution System Protection Measures Storage tanks Remove vegetation or other items that may hide an attacker Install lighting Install locks, tampering/ intrusion alarms, and/or security cameras on tank ladders, scuttles, access panels, access ways, air vents, etc. Secure ladders/tank access Consider other users of tower Harden tank vents/overflows Distribution System Protection Measures:  Distribution System Protection Measures Pump Houses Damage can cripple water system or they can be used as toxin injection point Fence, Secure, & Alarm Backup power Backflow Preventors & Meters Devices create vulnerabilities for individual customers Install locking covers on backflow preventors Customer responsibility? Lock meter boxes/vaults Slide21:  SCADA & Electronic Controls SCADA & Electronic Controls :  SCADA & Electronic Controls Attacker does not have to physically be present Can be miles away or half way around the world SCADA attack can be used to damage controls/electronics or actual system components Example – Wastewater system attack in Australia Disgruntled employee of a consultant used SCADA vulnerabilities and laptop computer to attack system Controlled pumps & valves and caused raw sewage to be dumped in waterways, parks, and neighborhoods Only caught when police found computer equipment and stolen cell phone during a traffic stop SCADA & Electronic Controls Protection Measures:  SCADA & Electronic Controls Protection Measures Develop a attack detection strategy Develop an attack response plan Conduct a thorough analysis to assess the risk and necessity of each connection to the SCADA network. Identify and evaluate the following types of connections: Internal local area networks (LAN) and wide area networks (WAN) Internet Wireless network devices Modem or dial-up connections Connections to contractors, consultants, vendors, or regulatory agencies SCADA & Electronic Controls Protection Measures:  SCADA & Electronic Controls Protection Measures Isolate the SCADA network from other network connections Many older SCADA systems have few or no security features Some SCADA systems use unique proprietary protocols for communications and the security some SCADA systems is based solely on the secrecy of these protocols Eliminate backdoors or vendor interfaces to the SCADA system Install SCADA overrides for local control points are critical to operate the system in the event of attack or threat of attack Slide25:  Contaminant Detection Systems Contaminant Detection Systems:  Contaminant Detection Systems There are several types of contaminant detection systems Single sample testing Standard Laboratory procedures Rapid Toxicity Testing Systems Continuous on-line (real time) monitoring Biomonitoring (Bioassay) Standard Parameters using detection algorithm Emerging Technologies Currently there is no recognized industry or military standard for on-line contamination detection within a water distribution system EPA Rapid Toxicity Testing :  EPA Rapid Toxicity Testing The EPA has approved several “Rapid Toxicity Testing Systems” 8 were approved in November 2003 Mainly for chemical agent detection in single samples Contaminants detected, detection limits, false positives, shelf life, and other limiting factors vary by system Other systems are currently under review Information on these systems are available from the EPA website http://www.epa.gov/etv/verifications/vcenter1-27.html An Ideal On-Line Contaminant Detection Systems:  An Ideal On-Line Contaminant Detection Systems An ideal continuous on-line warning system would: provide sufficient warning time to minimizing exposure to at risk population Detect, identify, and determine concentration of a wide range of contaminants Be affordable Be reliable Be easy to operate Give a minimal number of false alarms Support existing regulatory surveillance activities Current technologies are not yet proven to meet all of these goals Bio-Monitoring Contaminant Detection Systems:  Bio-Monitoring Contaminant Detection Systems Biomonitoring (Bioassay) monitoring can detect a wide variety of compounds and toxins These systems only detect that “something” is wrong, but not “what” is wrong. They work by monitoring the effect of toxins on living test organisms including: mussels fluorescent algae water fleas (daphnia) fish, or other organisms Follow on testing required to identify toxin Detection Algorithm Using Standard Parameters:  Detection Algorithm Using Standard Parameters System monitors changes in standard parameters Chlorine, pH, conductivity, turbidity, TDS, TOC, etc. Algorithm determines when relative changes in several parameters indicate contamination Algorithms can predict likely contaminant “Learning” period required for Algorithm to learn normal changes in water quality parameters specific to that water system in order to reduce false alarms Learns Seasonal variations, different sources, etc. However, there is still the likelihood of false alarms Detection Algorithm Using Standard Parameters:  Detection Algorithm Using Standard Parameters Two aspects of potential technology: Detection (i.e., alarm) Identification of contaminant One vendor is marketing a system claiming to accomplish both aspects Several other companies are bringing devices to market in near future Current systems do not address biological contamination Detection Algorithm Using Standard Parameters:  Detection Algorithm Using Standard Parameters The Air Force moving forward with field testing of one of these systems HQ Air Force Institute for Operational Health (AFIOH) has lead in testing Testing will occur at up to five Air Force sites over 24 month period US Army currently testing same system for effectiveness with chemical warfare agents Some civilian water utilities are purchasing or testing devices and reporting results in various trade publications Future Contaminant Detection Systems:  Future Contaminant Detection Systems US EPA has requested $44M in FY06 for Water Sentinel Program Detection technologies, triggers, responses Focused on civilian water systems Future Contaminant Detection Systems:  Future Contaminant Detection Systems Several systems under development show great promise in detecting virtually all potential terrorist agents These systems include detectors using: Immunoassays Bioactive compounds Deoxyribonucleic acid/ribonucleic acid (DNA/RNA) And other methods Technology promises very low detection limits little as a single cell of a biological agent or a few molecules of a chemical agent Most are one to several years away from commercial release Selection of an On-Line Contaminant Detection System:  Selection of an On-Line Contaminant Detection System Factors in Selection of an On-Line Contaminant Detection System Is the need for a detection system risk driven? Can selected sampling location(s) detect contamination from likely sources and still provide adequate warning to at risk population? Can the system reliably detect contaminants of concern at low enough levels to prevent sickness? Has an “auto-sampler” been included? How will the system be operated and maintained? Does the system support existing regulatory surveillance activities? Is anticipated false alarm rate acceptable? Has a detailed response plan been developed in the event of an alarm? Slide36:  Security Measure Selection Criteria Security Measure Selection Criteria:  Security Measure Selection Criteria Is the need for the security upgrade/improvement based on a documented risk? Water System Vulnerability Assessment Does the upgrade/improvement enhance day to day operation, reliability, customer service, or regulatory compliance? Design features should be based on highest threat anticipated by vulnerability assessment Changing threat levels impact operational procedures, not design criteria Does the security upgrade/improvement mesh with the Emergency Response Plan Can the risk be mitigated by low tech or low cost operational changes rather than by high tech or an expensive capital upgrade? Slide38:  Water Security Design Guidance Free Publications on Water Security Design:  Free Publications on Water Security Design EPA Grant Funded Water Infrastructure Security Enhancements Guidance Documents: http://www.awwa.org/science/wise/ or http://www.asce.org/static/1/wise.cfm Interim Voluntary Guidelines for Designing an Online Contaminant Monitoring System Interim Voluntary Security Guidance for Water Utilities Interim Voluntary Security Guidance for Wastewater/Stormwater Utilities These Interim Voluntary Guides are scheduled to be replaced with Voluntary Standards in 2006. Department Of Energy 21 Steps to Improve Cyber Security of SCADA Networks http://www.nasact.org/IISAF/downloads/21_steps.pdf or http://www.esisac.com/publicdocs/21StepsBooklet.pdf Department of Defense Publications:  Department of Defense Publications Air Force AFMAN 32-1071, Security Engineering (FOUO) ETL 04-5, Design Recommendations for Potable Water System Security (FOUO) Air Force WVA Technical Report - Water Vulnerability and Risk Assessments for Potable Water Assets (FOUO) Army FM 3-19.30 (Formerly FM 19-30), Physical Security (UNCLASS) TG 188, Food and Water Vulnerability Assessment Guide (FOUO) USACHPPM TG 297 Emergency Response Planning for Military Water Systems (UNCLASS) http://chppm-www.apgea.army.mil/documents/TG/TECHGUID/TG297.pdf Access to some of these publications is restricted Other Water Security Information Sources:  Other Water Security Information Sources US EPA Water Security Website http://cfpub.epa.gov/safewater/watersecurity/index.cfm Water Information Sharing and analysis Center (ISAC) http://www.waterisac.org American Water Works Association http://www.awwa.org National Drinking Water Clearing House, Small Water System Security Website http://www.nesc.wvu.edu/ndwc/ndwc_protect.htm Your State Homeland Security Office There are many other water security resources too numerous to list Conclusion:  Conclusion Water systems are vulnerable Hardening water system alone does not provide security Water security must include operational procedures Properly designed security measures enhance day to day operation of the water system Water system security must be a comprehensive program that includes Delaying an adversary Detecting the adversary And the appropriate response This presentation provides only a few specific examples of potential vulnerabilities and possible countermeasure features Refer to the detailed guidance and other references mentioned in this presentation for more information Questions:  Questions Michael X. Clawson, PE, REM HQ AFCESA/CESC 139 Barnes Drive, Suite 1 Tyndall AFB, FL 32403-5319 (850)283-6362 E-mail: Michael.Clawson@tyndall.af.mil HQ AFCESA Website: www.afcesa.af.mil

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