advertisement

The US Navy in WW II; session i

50 %
50 %
advertisement
Information about The US Navy in WW II; session i
Education

Published on March 4, 2014

Author: jbpowers

Source: slideshare.net

Description

This series is based on my Annapolis textbook, Sea Power.
advertisement

The U.S. Navy in World War II session i-1919-1939-Why England [and America] Slept

“In reading statements like that of Sir Arthur Balfour, Chairman of the Balfour Steel Company [and former British Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary-jbp], made in 1933, ‘One of the gravest menaces to peace today is the totally unarmed condition of Germany,’ we should not dismiss it as being blindly stupid. We must remember that in the summer of 1939 a sufficient number of the Senate of the United States believed that there would not be a war in Europe this year, and refused to repeal the embargo on arms. Every country makes great errors and there is usually a good reason for it at the time.” ! John F. Kennedy, Why England Slept. New York : Wilfred Funk, Inc., 1940, p. xxvii

June 1938-John Kennedy sailed with his father and brother Joe, Jr. to work with his father, Joe, Sr., who was FDR’s Ambassador to the Court of St. James, London 1939-to prepare for his Harvard senior honors thesis, he toured Europe, the USSR, the Balkans and the Middle East he then went to recently occupied Czechoslovakia and Hitler’s Third Reich 1 September 1939-Kennedy returned to London the day WW II began. He was in Parliament two days later as Chamberlain regretfully delivered the war message the paperback edition 1940-his completed thesis, “Appeasement in Munich,” became the bestseller, Why England Slept

major topics in this session • I. Ending the War to End All Wars • II. The Democracies Disarm • III. The March of Fascist Aggression • IV. Final Failure of Collective Security • V. Popular Opinion and Grand Strategy

Text I. Ending the War to End all Wars the League of Nations

“…our ideas about the First World War are…confused. Few…have much idea why Europe took to arms, though they may know that a Ruritanian bigwig with an extravagant moustache got shot.” ! Sir Max Hastings, “1914 : Why Britain Had to Go to War.” in BBC History, November, 2013, p. 41

“…our ideas about the First World War are…confused. Few…have much idea why Europe took to arms, though they may know that a Ruritanian bigwig with an extravagant moustache got shot. The most widely held belief is that the war was simply a ghastly mistake—an exercise in futility for which all the powers involved shared blame, its folly compounded by the murderous incompetence of the generals. “This is the ‘poets’ view’, first articulated by the likes of Siegfried Sassoon, Robert Graves, and Wilfred Owen. Amid the mud and blood, they felt no discernible cause was worth the ghastly slaughter that was taking place—that it would be better to end it on any terms rather than to pursue a meaningless victory.” ! Sir Max Hastings, “1914 : Why Britain Had to Go to War.” in BBC History, November, 2013, p. 41

“World War I utterly destroyed the polity of Europe, so carefully nurtured through a hundred years of painstaking statesmanship. What survived was no brave new world but the wreckage of a social and economic order. Nor could anyone hope to restore that serenity and confidence in inevitable progress which had characterized the preceding century. ! “In the Allied states demobilization and rebuilding began at once. Munitions and shipbuilding programs were shelved. Obnoxious controls could be abolished. Dangerously inflated national budgets could be balanced. In the United States particularly, the tradition of isolationism made the people impatient to get back to what President Harding a little later was to call ‘normalcy.’” Sea Power, p. 476

Postwar Operations of the U. S. Navy Nov 1918-Nov 1919—the immediate task was to bring home the American Expeditionary Force—more than 2,000,000 men. All available ships—cruisers, battleships, cargo vessels, German ships turned over to the Allies under terms of the Armistice—were diverted to ferrying troops to Sept 1919—another major chore was lifting the North Sea Mine Barrage, now simply a hazard to peaceful shipping. A fleet of 89 sweepers completed this difficult & dangerous task quasi-diplomatic missions: American Adriatic Squadron administered the 300 mile Dalmatian coast of the new Yugoslavia RAdm. Bristol, American High Commissioner in Constantinople, 1919-1927, mixed diplomacy and naval power. Evacuated the Whites from the Black Sea ports after Red victory in 1920. Evacuated 262,000 Greeks from Turkish Aegean coast, 1921-22 until Apr 1920-aid to the Whites was concealed in missions to Archangel and Vladivostok to guard munitions sent to the preBolshevik government. Another aim was to keep the Japanese from seizing Russia’s Maritime Province

Postwar Operations of the U. S. Navy Nov 1918-Nov 1919—the immediate task was to bring home the American Expeditionary Force—more than 2,000,000 men. All available ships—cruisers, battleships, cargo vessels, German ships turned over to the Allies under terms of the Armistice—were diverted to ferrying troops to Sept 1919—another major chore was lifting the North Sea Mine Barrage, now simply a hazard to peaceful shipping. A fleet of 89 sweepers completed this difficult & dangerous task quasi-diplomatic missions: American Adriatic Squadron administered the 300 mile Dalmatian coast of the new Yugoslavia RAdm. Bristol, American High Commissioner in Constantinople, 1919-1927, mixed diplomacy and naval power. Evacuated the Whites from the Black Sea ports after Red victory in 1920. Evacuated 262,000 Greeks from Turkish Aegean coast, 1921-22 until Apr 1920-aid to the Whites was concealed in missions to Archangel and Vladivostok to guard munitions sent to the preBolshevik government. Another aim was to keep the Japanese from seizing Russia’s Maritime Province

Postwar Operations of the U. S. Navy Nov 1918-Nov 1919—the immediate task was to bring home the American Expeditionary Force—more than 2,000,000 men. All available ships—cruisers, battleships, cargo vessels, German ships turned over to the Allies under terms of the Armistice—were diverted to ferrying troops to Sept 1919—another major chore was lifting the North Sea Mine Barrage, now simply a hazard to peaceful shipping. A fleet of 89 sweepers completed this difficult & dangerous task quasi-diplomatic missions: American Adriatic Squadron administered the 300 mile Dalmatian coast of the new Yugoslavia RAdm. Bristol, American High Commissioner in Constantinople, 1919-1927, mixed diplomacy and naval power. Evacuated the Whites from the Black Sea ports after Red victory in 1920. Evacuated 262,000 Greeks from Turkish Aegean coast, 1921-22 until Apr 1920-aid to the Whites was concealed in missions to Archangel and Vladivostok to guard munitions sent to the preBolshevik government. Another aim was to keep the Japanese from seizing Russia’s Maritime Province 1920s—Mission Accomplished—public apathy characteristic of post-war periods. Only “showing the flag” operations such as the Yangtze Patrol a new emphasis on technical R & D and on improving operating procedures was characteristic of the whole interwar period

The New Alignment of Powers—“The prewar balance of power in Europe was destroyed”—[“the war after the war”—jbp] Germany was prostrate and convulsed by political revolution, presumably disarmed for the indefinite future Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires dismembered, Russian Empire torn by revolution and civil war nor did the victors fare much better: France and Italy were on the verge of bankruptcy Britain also found herself relatively poor and deeply in debt to the United States this economic situation led the victors to demand reparations from the Central Powers at the Paris Peace conference the human losses were so severe that they would experience a dearth of able leadership for a generation to come for Japan and the United States the result was quite the opposite Japan’s efforts were mainly in the Pacific where she scooped up territorial gains at a minimal cost America, a “debtor nation” in 1914, now found herself the world’s foremost creditor. Her economic efforts had shown the world the miracles which American industry could accomplish Ibid.

Text The Paris Peace Conference January-June, 1919 The Big Four: David Lloyd George, Vittorio Orlando, Georges Clemenceau, Woodrow Wilson

Wilson arrived at the Paris Peace Conference after a triumphal tour of the Allied Countries where he was hailed as their savior. The other Big Three, all cynical old-school European statesmen, couldn’t grasp that Wilson actually believed in his Fourteen Points and would fight for them. Britain particularly disliked Point 2, “Freedom of the Seas,” which potentially nullified their use of blockade and the value of their naval supremacy. All three were skeptical of Point 4: “…national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety” The Three had thought that the Fourteen Points had been just another piece of wartime propaganda such as they had engaged in. They were also united in opposing Point 5, the adjustment of colonial claims, as threatening their empires. ! A frustrated President Wilson gave in on all but Point 14: “A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.” He believed that the League of Nations could undo whatever evil consequences came from the other terms of the peace treaties. The supreme irony would be that he couldn’t convince his own country to enter this paramount accomplishment. His frustration led to partisan fury and a stressful whistle stop campaign to build popular support for the treaty. He never recovered fully from the stroke which ended his effort in October, 1919. ! jbp

William Orpen – The Signing of Peace in the Hall of Mirrors, Versailles 1919 (detail)! Germany’s chief of delegation swallows the bitter pill, source of so much evil

On the other hand… In preparation for the WW I centennial the BBC prepared a list of ten myths: The  Versailles  Treaty  was  extremely  harsh   The  treaty  of  Versailles  confiscated  10%  of  Germany's  territory  but  le;  it  the  largest,  richest  na>on  in   central  Europe.   It  was  largely  unoccupied  and  financial  repara>ons  were  linked  to  its  ability  to  pay,  which  mostly  went   unenforced  anyway.   ! The  treaty  was  notably  less  harsh  than  trea>es  that  ended  the  1870-­‐71  Franco-­‐Prussian  War  and  World   War  Two.  The  German  victors  in  the  former  annexed  large  chunks  of  two  rich  French  provinces,  part  of   France  for  between  2-­‐300  years,  and  home  to  most  of  French  iron  ore  produc>on,  as  well  as  presen>ng   France  with  a  massive  bill  for  immediate  payment.   ! A;er  WW2  Germany  was  occupied,  split  up,  her  factory  machinery  smashed  or  stolen  and  millions  of   prisoners  forced  to  stay  with  their  [Soviet,  jbp]  captors  and  work  as  slave  labourers.  Germany  lost  all  the   territory  it  had  gained  a;er  WW1  and  another  giant  slice  on  top  of  that.   ! Versailles  was  not  harsh  but  was  portrayed  as  such  by  Hitler  who  sought  to  create  a  >dal  wave  of  an>-­‐ Versailles  sen>ment  on  which  he  could  then  ride  into  power. e-Mail from Geoff Strauss, 22 Jan 2014

Käthe Kollwitz’ sculpture “Mother with her dead son” Berlin, the Neue Wache, 1993—after unification

In Germany:Two Equally Dangerous Consequences The Left’s determination to stamp out militarism, artistically embodied in Käthe Kollwitz’ work. Her son had died in the war

In Germany:Two Equally Dangerous Consequences The Left’s determination to stamp out militarism, artistically embodied in Käthe Kollwitz’ work. Her son had died in the war the Right was furious with the Communist uprisings in the naval bases, Berlin and Bavaria and the Socialist government of the Weimar Republic this gave rise to the “Backstab” myth: the German army had never been defeated on the battlefield the nation had been stabbed in the back by the “Socis” and the “Kommis,” many of whom were Jews

In Germany:Two Equally Dangerous Consequences The Left’s determination to stamp out militarism, artistically embodied in Käthe Kollwitz’ work. Her son had died in the war the Right was furious with the Communist uprisings in the naval bases, Berlin and Bavaria and the Socialist government of the Weimar Republic this gave rise to the “Backstab” myth: the German army had never been defeated on the battlefield the nation had been stabbed in the back by the “Socis” and the “Kommis,” many of whom were Jews various conservative nationalist militarist groups arose to denounce the hated Versailles Diktat, among them a small group calling themselves the National Socialist German Workers Party, Nazi for short

“Socialist Realist” painting of how Hitler liked to recall his early campaign—US Army collection

“The preamble to Article V of the Treaty says, ‘In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations, Germany undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval, and air clauses which follow. This clause was reinforced by another: ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! The Allied and Associated Powers…recognize that the acceptance by Germany of the terms laid down for her own disarmament will facilitate and hasten the accomplishment of a general reduction of armaments, and they intend to open negotiations immediately with a view to the eventual adoption of a scheme of general reduction…. The Germans have since argued that this implied an almost contractual obligation for the Allies to disarm when they had… ! Kennedy, Why England Slept, p. 10

The End of the German High Seas Fleet—The armistice required Germany to intern her warships until their final fate would be determined by the peace treaty Germany’s capital ships, Kaiser Wilhelm’s pride, had been kept in port after the indecisive battle of Jutland, May, 1916 Nov 1918-now they sailed across the North Sea to the British base at Scapa Flow in the Orkney Islands north of Scotland as news from the peace conference began to leak, the German commander Adm. von Reuter made secret preparations to scuttle the fleet rather than allow it to be parceled out among the victors this act of defiance succeeded in destroying most of the major ships 15 of the 16 capital ships 5 of the 8 cruisers 32 of the 50 destroyers highly popular in Germany, as redeeming the national honor, this gesture fueled the post-war bitterness between the victors and the vanquished

Orkneys

SMS Hindenburg at Scapa

SMS Bayern sinking 21 Jun 1919

SMS Seydlitz capsized

Only the upper works of the Hindenburg remain above water

The League of Nations & Disarmament “…many in Britain [believed] that any increase in armaments was a blow to the League of Nations “…League supporters felt that ‘without disarmament, in short, the League can have no reality “…Article VIII, calling for the reduction of armaments, is really the first clause of the Covenant [the League’s Charter or constitution], as the first seven clauses deal with the mechanics of the League machinery “A waste of money, and life, a sham and a blot on mankind, a danger for peace, armaments were the first evil which the drafters of the League Covenant sought to secure.” Kennedy, op.cit., pp. 7-8

Postwar Building Programs “All through the war, the Japanese had pursued an active naval building program in their new yards, and immediately afterwards were pushing to completion several capital ships* on the ways. On the other hand, French and Italian construction had been largely suspended during hostilities, and the empty national treasuries of those countries gave little prospect of a spirited renewal of large-scale building. “Of all the naval powers, only Britain’s recent ally, the United States, seemed in any position to challenge Britain’s naval ascendancy….Britain had had a long tough war and felt entitled to a period of relaxation. Certainly it would be less than friendly for the United States at such a time to bring on a naval armaments race. “This pardonable British prejudice however failed to take into account the stubborn complex personality of the American President. A man of peace dedicated to the spirit of reform, he had nevertheless been the Commander in Chief of a great nation in time of war….What the cynical leadership in Europe’s capitals could never quite realize about Wilson was the incredible fact that he always meant what he said…. “This aside on Wilson’s character is germane to American naval policy in the immediate postwar period…..[Britain’s rejection of Point 2] Wilson’s reaction was to request Congress for a new building program that would double the heavy 1916 schedule. Sea Power, pp. 478-479 _______________ * there is no rigorous definition of the term but major warships displacing 10,000 tons or more is often used—jbp

America and Britain Compared “At the end of the war the United States had 16 dreadnought* battleships, none more than eight years old.” _______________ *the modern “all-big-gun” ship type pioneered by HMS Dreadnought, 1906-1923 Sea Power, p. 479

America and Britain Compared “At the end of the war the United States had 16 dreadnought* battleships, none more than eight years old. USS Texas, 1912-1945 _______________ *the modern “all-big-gun” ship type pioneered by HMS Dreadnought, 1906-1923 Sea Power, p. 479

America and Britain Compared “At the end of the war the United States had 16 dreadnought* battleships, none more than eight years old. Though the British could count 42 capital ships in their navy, 13 of these were already obsolescent. Besides after the experience of Jutland, the nine battle cruisers (bigger than a heavy cruiser, smaller than a battleship)… HMS Invincible, 1909-1916 sunk at Jutland _______________ *the modern “all-big-gun” ship type pioneered by HMS Dreadnought, 1906-1923 Sea Power, p. 479

America and Britain Compared “At the end of the war the United States had 16 dreadnought* battleships, none more than eight years old. Though the British could count 42 capital ships in their navy, 13 of these were already obsolescent. Besides after the experience of Jutland, the nine battle cruisers• (bigger than a heavy cruiser, smaller than a battleship) in the total could be questioned as vessels worthy of a place in the line. For the United States merely to complete its 1916 program, incorporating the lessons of the war in the new ships, would have provided 35 modern units, and a fleet qualitatively much superior to the battle-worn British Grand Fleet. The entire proposed 1919 program would mean a fleet of over 50 first-line vessels, utterly eclipsing the British navy. _______________ *the modern “all-big-gun” ship type pioneered by HMS Dreadnought, 1906-1923 Sea Power, p. 479

America and Britain Compared “At the end of the war the United States had 16 dreadnought* battleships, none more than eight years old. Though the British could count 42 capital ships in their navy, 13 of these were already obsolescent. Besides after the experience of Jutland, the nine battle cruisers• (bigger than a heavy cruiser, smaller than a battleship•) in the total could be questioned as vessels worthy of a place in the line. For the United States merely to complete its 1916 program, incorporating the lessons of the war in the new ships, would have provided 35 modern units, and a fleet qualitatively much superior to the battle-worn British Grand Fleet. The entire proposed 1919 program would mean a fleet of over 50 first-line vessels, utterly eclipsing the British navy…. “…the British began to plan what would be needed to match or excel the American program…. “Most probably, Wilson, irritated at the British attitude on the ‘freedom of the seas’ issue and concerned over Japanese saber-rattling in the Far East, simply desired a much larger navy….On the other hand, it has also been suggested that he intended to use the threat of completion of the 1919 program as a club over the head of the British, who did not then appear enthusiastic about Wilson’s dream—the League of Nations.” _______________ *the modern “all-big-gun” ship type pioneered by HMS Dreadnought, 1906-1923 Sea Power, p. 479

Text II. The Democracies Disarm the Washington Treaty for Naval Disarmament (1922)

Scene at the Philadelphia Navy Yard, Pennsylvania, December 1923, with guns from scrapped battleships in the foreground. One of these guns is marked "Kansas", presumably an indication that it came from USS Kansas (BB-21).! Ship being dismantled in the background is USS South Carolina (BB-26).

The Background of the Washington Conference “Whatever Wilson intended, his vision of a new world order flickered out in the last year of his presidency. The rejection of the League of Nations by his own country, his party’s repudiation in the 1920 election, and his own serious illness all combined to embitter his departure from the White House. He excoriated America’s ‘sullen and selfish isolation’. Sea Power, p. 480

The Background of the Washington Conference “Whatever Wilson intended, his vision of a new world order flickered out in the last year of his presidency. The rejection of the League of Nations by his own country, his party’s repudiation in the 1920 election, and his own serious illness all combined to embitter his departure from the White House.• He excoriated America’s ‘sullen and selfish isolation’. ! “With popular support, Harding and the Republican Party had disowned the League, but the notion of disarmament appeared to have great public appeal. In early 1921 Senator Borah of Idaho introduced what was to become a joint congressional resolution favoring a tripartite disarmament conference; it passed the Senate unanimously, and the House by a vote of 332 to 4. Almost immediately the British Foreign Office intimated that it would be happy to follow America’s lead in calling such a conference.” Sea Power, p. 480

The Background of the Washington Conference “Whatever Wilson intended, his vision of a new world order flickered out in the last year of his presidency. The rejection of the League of Nations by his own country, his party’s repudiation in the 1920 election, and his own serious illness all combined to embitter his departure from the White House.• He excoriated America’s ‘sullen and selfish isolation’. ! “With popular support, Harding and the Republican Party had disowned the League, but the notion of disarmament appeared to have great public appeal. In early 1921 Senator Borah of Idaho introduced what was to become a joint congressional resolution favoring a tripartite disarmament conference; it passed the Senate unanimously, and the House by a vote of 332 to 4. Almost immediately the British Foreign Office intimated that it would be happy to follow America’s lead in calling such a conference. Accordingly Charles Evans Hughes, Harding’s able Secretary of State, made informal overtures to the governments of Britain, Japan, France and Italy. Sea Power, p. 480

“The Background of the Washington Conference “All but Japan promptly replied with polite enthusiasm. The Japanese appeared reluctant. Diplomatic friction between Japan and the United States had been frequent and acute. During and immediately after the war, Japanese territorial aims on continental Asia [cf. their occupation of Vladivostok during the Russian Civil War, 1919-20,- jbp] had become more obvious. With good reason the Japanese suspected that the conference was in part a device to abrogate the Anglo-Japanese Alliance [of 1902, Britain’s first move away from ‘Splendid Isolation’- jbp], which they wished to preserve. On the other hand, they were persuaded that the projected American naval building program was directed at them. And they could afford an armaments race with the United States even less than the British. Besides, it would be incompatible with the Imperial Japan to stay at home from a major conference attended by all the other first-class powers. So, after a two-and-a-half-week delay, Tokyo announced that Japan too would discuss naval disarmament and Far Eastern affairs in Washington.” Ibid.

“The way to disarm is to disarm.”— Charles Evans Hughes 12 November 1921-after an emotional ceremony dedicating the tomb of the unknown soldier in Arlington National Ceremony, the delegates to America’s first international conference convened in the Memorial Continental Hall of the DAR

“The way to disarm is to disarm.”— Charles Evans Hughes 12 November 1921-after an emotional ceremony dedicating the tomb of the unknown soldier in Arlington National Ceremony, the delegates to America’s first international conference convened in the Memorial Continental Hall of the DAR Secretary of State Hughes startled the delegates and delighted the press by opening the conference with America’s proposal: a ten year building “holiday” on capital ships the scrapping of capital ships “built and building” to reach the famous 5 : 5 : 3 ratio between the U.S., Britain, and Japan. That is, the U.S. would scrap ships to reach a maximum of 500,000 tons, &c. (France and Italy were to be limited to 175,000 tons @) aircraft carriers would be limited to 27,000 ton displacement other categories of lesser ships were also defined [ but limits were never agreed upon in the final treaty!] disagreement on terms regarding submarines led to this also being left unresolved in the final Five Power Treaty

Japan’s Internal Dispute “The Japanese delegation was divided. Japanese naval doctrine required the maintenance of a fleet 70% the size of that of the US, which was felt to be the minimum necessary to defeat the US in any subsequent war; … thus a 5:3 ratio, or 60%, was unacceptable.! Wikipedia

Japan’s Internal Dispute “The Japanese delegation was divided. Japanese naval doctrine required the maintenance of a fleet 70% the size of that of the US, which was felt to be the minimum necessary to defeat the US in any subsequent war; … thus a 5:3 ratio, or 60%, was unacceptable. Nevertheless, the director of the delegation, Katō Tomosaburō•, favoured accepting a 60% ratio to the prospect of an arms race with the US, as the relative industrial output of the two nations would cause Japan to lose such an arms race and might cause an economic crisis as a consequence.! Wikipedia

Japan’s Internal Dispute “The Japanese delegation was divided. Japanese naval doctrine required the maintenance of a fleet 70% the size of that of the US, which was felt to be the minimum necessary to defeat the US in any subsequent war; … thus a 5:3 ratio, or 60%, was unacceptable. Nevertheless, the director of the delegation, Katō Tomosaburō•, favoured accepting a 60% ratio to the prospect of an arms race with the US, as the relative industrial output of the two nations would cause Japan to lose such an arms race and might cause an economic crisis as a consequence.! “His opinion was opposed strongly by Katō Kanji•, the president of the Naval Staff College, who acted as his chief naval aide at the delegation, and who represented the influential "big navy" school of thought. This school of thought held that in the event of war the USA would be able to build indefinitely more warships, given its huge industrial power, and Japan thus needed to prepare as thoroughly as possible for the inevitable conflict with America. Katō Tomosaburō was finally able to persuade the Japanese high command to accept the Hughes proposals, but the outcome of the Treaty was a cause of controversy in the Japanese navy for years to come.” Wikipedia

The Non-Fortification Clause “An integral part of the [final] treaty was the controversial non-fortification clause, bitterly denounced by the professional representatives of the American navy. This provided that the Pacific powers were not to arm or fortify bases in their island possessions, except that the Japanese might do as they chose in their home islands, and the Americans in the Hawaiian group. It did mean, however, that Britain was barred from fortifying Hong Kong, Borneo, the Solomons, and the Gilberts; Japan was barred from further fortifying Formosa or the former German possessions in the Pacific north of the equator, which had been mandated to her…the United States was barred from fortifying Samoa, Wake, Guam, and, most important, the Philippines. “American naval authorities were shocked [that this effectively underwrote] Japanese naval supremacy in the Far East. Subsequent history has of course largely substantiated this view. “Yet in the context of the times, the willingness of the American delegation to surrender on this point is understandable. The Japanese were displeased at the imputation of inferiority implied in the 5 : 5 : 3 ratio. It is likely that the non-fortification clause was an essential part of their price of acceptance of the treaty. Second, there was a well-founded conviction on the part of the American delegation that it was bargaining away an empty right, one that Congress would probably either never exercise at all or else implement on too modest a scale to make any difference in event of war….On the other hand, there was good reason to think Japan would fortify her island possessions in the absence of treaty provision.9” ____________ 9 In fact, of course, the Japanese broke their word on this provision, but not until several years after the treaty. Sea Power, pp. 481-482

The Nine-Power Treaty10 and the Four-Power Pact11 in addition to the most important Disarmament Treaty, two other documents were produced at the Washington Conference the Nine-Power Treaty was essentially a multilateral endorsement of America’s “Open Door” policy, originally promoted at the turn of the century it reaffirmed the territorial integrity of China at a time when she was convulsed by warlords and there was the very real prospect of Japanese and , later, Soviet aggrandizement “The Four-Power Pact was designed to save face for Japan in the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. It provided that the signatory powers would “respect” each other’s Far Eastern possessions “Both these treaties represented considerable triumphs for American diplomacy “In them, Japan, the only nation [then capable] of aggressive designs in the Far East, agreed formally to policies inconsistent with aggression” 10 Nine-Power Treaty: U.S., Britain, Japan, France, Italy, plus Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal, China 11 Four-Power Pact: U.S., Britain, Japan, France Sea Power, p. 482

Results of the Washington Conference “At the time, world opinion hailed the Washington treaties as a triumph of diplomacy, a milestone in the world’s progress to a millennium of peace “…ratified…, the world’s navies settled down to a period of comparative stagnation in new construction.” Sea Power, p. 482

Results of the Washington Conference “At the time, world opinion hailed the Washington treaties as a triumph of diplomacy, a milestone in the world’s progress to a millennium of peace “…ratified…, the world’s navies settled down to a period of comparative stagnation in new construction.” “The American State Department could count the conference a success in achieving its main goals… “On the other hand, in failing to limit cruiser tonnage, the treaty had simply diverted British and Japanese appropriations to lesser ship types, in which the U.S. was to become more and more inferior….. “Finally, most damning, the simple fact is that aggression has seldom been arrested by ‘a scrap of paper’. “It may reasonably argued that the limitations of the Washington Disarmament Conference were in fact a step along the path leading to the Pearl Harbor attack. Certain it is, in any event, that the naval treaty made no such contribution to world peace as its sponsors hoped.” Sea Power, pp. 482-483

“Later Naval Disarmament Conferences” 1927-the Geneva Naval Conference “…called by [U.S. President] Coolidge specifically to impose the 5 : 5 : 3 ratio on cruiser tonnage was a total failure 1930-at the London Conference “Britain and the U.S. reached a compromise on the troublesome cruiser issue, each to be allowed 339,000 tons….Japan acceded to the agreements conditional to an altered 10 : 10 : 7 ratio in cruisers and parity in submarines. Sea Power, p. 483

“Later Naval Disarmament Conferences” 1927-the Geneva Naval Conference “…called by [U.S. President] Coolidge specifically to impose the 5 : 5 : 3 ratio on cruiser tonnage was a total failure 1930-at the London Conference “Britain and the U.S. reached a compromise on the troublesome cruiser issue, each to be allowed 339,000 tons….Japan acceded to the agreements conditional to an altered 10 : 10 : 7 ratio in cruisers and parity in submarines. Sea Power, p. 483

“Later Naval Disarmament Conferences” 1927-the Geneva Naval Conference “…called by [U.S. President] Coolidge specifically to impose the 5 : 5 : 3 ratio on cruiser tonnage was a total failure 1930-at the London Conference “Britain and the U.S. reached a compromise on the troublesome cruiser issue, each to be allowed 339,000 tons….Japan acceded to the agreements conditional to an altered 10 : 10 : 7 ratio in cruisers and parity in submarines. “Submarine tonnage for all three powers was fixed at 52,700 each. The ban on capital ship construction was extended to the end of 1936 “Since France and Italy had refused participation, it was felt necessary to include certain “escape clauses’ permitting further construction in the event a non signatory power engaged in competitive building. “Even in 1930 the auguries for navies regulated by the precise scales of diplomacy had ceased to be favorable.” Sea Power, p. 483

“Throughout the decade of the 1930’s, the post-Versailles international political system was on greased skids sloping off to war. A General Disarmament Conference in 1932-33 at Geneva• failed abjectly. [more about this later] Sea Power, pp. 483-484

“Throughout the decade of the 1930’s, the post-Versailles international political system was on greased skids sloping off to war. A General Disarmament Conference in 1932-33 at Geneva• failed abjectly. [more about this later] The Second London Naval Disarmament Conference (1935-36) was a final effort at perpetuating the principle of treaty limitation of navies. The aggressions of Japan, Italy, and Germany, and their manifest contempt for existing treaties foredoomed the London Conference. Britain had already surrendered a principle to Germany in a bilateral naval treaty in 1935, by the terms of which Germany was “allowed” 35 percent of Britain’s naval tonnage and parity in submarines. Both France and Italy were engaged in substantial building programs. Italy refused participation at the start. The Japanese then demanded full parity in all categories. The American delegation demurring, the Japanese withdrew from the conference. The U.S., Britain, and France finally signed a treaty so watered down with “escalator clauses” as to be virtually meaningless. For practical purposes, all treaty limitations of navies expired December 31, 1936. Sea Power, pp. 483-484

American Building Policy in the 1930’s 4 March 1933-a new phase began with the inauguration of FDR like TR earlier, he “showed a perception of the intimate relationship between diplomatic and military strength. “He recognized the true seriousness of the deteriorating world situation, and knew that navies cannot be improvised in the face of an emergency. Sea Power, p. 484

American Building Policy in the 1930’s 4 March 1933-a new phase began with the inauguration of FDR like TR earlier, he “showed a perception of the intimate relationship between diplomatic and military strength. “He recognized the true seriousness of the deteriorating world situation, and knew that navies cannot be improvised in the face of an emergency. “Furthermore, again like the earlier Roosevelt, he had gained professional knowledge of the service as Assistant Secretary of the Navy and had a hobbyist’s enthusiasm for the sea service. Sea Power, p. 484

American Building Policy in the 1930’s 4 March 1933-a new phase began with the inauguration of FDR like TR earlier, he “showed a perception of the intimate relationship between diplomatic and military strength. “He recognized the true seriousness of the deteriorating world situation, and knew that navies cannot be improvised in the face of an emergency. USS Philadelphia (CL-41) was laid down on 28 May 1935 at the Philadelphia Navy Yard; launched on 17 November 1936; sponsored by “Furthermore, again like the earlier Roosevelt, he had gained Mrs. George H. Earle, first lady of Pennsylvania; and commissioned at professional knowledge of the service as Assistant Philadelphia on 23 Secretary of the Navy and had a hobbyist’s enthusiasm for the sea service. September 1937, Captain Jules James in command. “The first substantial naval authorization of [his] first term came as a relief measure to assist the depressed steel and shipbuilding industries; section 202 of the National Industrial Recovery Act of June 16, 1933 authorized new construction in cruisers and lesser types to full treaty strength. 27 Mar 1934-the Vinson-Trammel Bill passed, providing for an eight-year replacement building program amounting to 102 ships 1934-1940-the naval appropriations implementing this program grew year by year finally approaching a billion dollars annually.” Sea Power, p. 484

American Building Policy in the 1930’s 1938- the Second Vinson Act authorized an additional 20% over-all tonnage increase “In addition to new construction, modernization of older vessels was undertaken; a new emphasis on naval aircraft and on carriers became apparent; new naval bases and air stations were established. U.S. Navy N3N trainers awaiting engines and other parts at Naval Aircraft Factory, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (USA), 28 June 1937. Sea Power, p. 484

After the fall of France, in June 1940, the limiting factor in American defense spending ceased to be Congressional reluctance to underwrite the services’ maximum programs: it was from then on simply the physical limitations of America’s industrial capacity. By the time of the Pearl Harbor attack (7 Dec 1941), the United States Navy had the following combat vessels in commission or on the ways: In Commission Battleships Building 17 15 Carriers 7 11 Cruisers 37 54 Destroyers 171 191 Submarines 111 73 Ibid.

The United States Merchant Marine “Virtually since the American Civil War, the American merchant marine has been at a competitive disadvantage in comparison with the shipping of other countries. In the 20th century, this has stemmed both from high construction costs and high costs of operation, which in turn have largely stemmed from high American labor costs. In those enterprises to which assembly-line techniques can be adapted, American industry can pay high wages and still undersell foreign competition in world markets. But neither the building nor the operation of ships lend themselves to the assembly line. In spite of high tariff protection, American ship building and operation could never compete effectively with that of other countries except with the additional crutch of federal subsidy…. “In 1936, Congress passed an important Shipping Act, which established a five-man Maritime Commission under Rear Admiral Emory S. Land USN (Ret.), and initiated a new program of direct subsidy, both for construction and operation….To qualify for subsidy, an operator had to carry crews two thirds of whom were United States citizens, and submit to certain investigatory and regulatory powers exercised by the commission. “Beginning in 1938, the Maritime Commission fostered a replacement program…which aimed to retire slow, obsolete craft at a rate of 50 ships a year….Under the forced draft of wartime, new construction was enormously increased. Yard capacity and the availability of shipyard workers• were the only effective limiting factors after the Pearl Harbor attack. Sea Power, pp. 484-485

The United States Merchant Marine “Virtually since the American Civil War, the American merchant marine has been at a competitive disadvantage in comparison with the shipping of other countries. In the 20th century, this has stemmed both from high construction costs and high costs of operation, which in turn have largely stemmed from high American labor costs. In those enterprises to which assembly-line techniques can be adapted, American industry can pay high wages and still undersell foreign competition in world markets. But neither the building nor the operation of ships lend themselves to the assembly line. In spite of high tariff protection, American ship building and operation could never compete effectively with that of other countries except with the additional crutch of federal subsidy…. “In 1936, Congress passed an important Shipping Act, which established a five-man Maritime Commission under Rear Admiral Emory S. Land USN (Ret.), and initiated a new program of direct subsidy, both for construction and operation….To qualify for subsidy, an operator had to carry crews two thirds of whom were United States citizens, and submit to certain investigatory and regulatory powers exercised by the commission. “Beginning in 1938, the Maritime Commission fostered a replacement program…which aimed to retire slow, obsolete craft at a rate of 50 ships a year….Under the forced draft of wartime, new construction was enormously increased. Yard capacity and the availability of shipyard workers• were the only effective limiting factors after the Pearl Harbor attack.” Sea Power, pp. 484-485 enter Rosie to fill the worker gap

The United States Merchant Marine “Virtually since the American Civil War, the American merchant marine has been at a competitive disadvantage in comparison with the shipping of other countries. In the 20th century, this has stemmed both from high construction costs and high costs of operation, which in turn have largely stemmed from high American labor costs. In those enterprises to which assembly-line techniques can be adapted, American industry can pay high wages and still undersell foreign competition in world markets. But neither the building nor the operation of ships lend themselves to the assembly line. In spite of high tariff protection, American ship building and operation could never compete effectively with that of other countries except with the additional crutch of federal subsidy…. “In 1936, Congress passed an important Shipping Act, which established a five-man Maritime Commission under Rear Admiral Emory S. Land USN (Ret.), and initiated a new program of direct subsidy, both for construction and operation….To qualify for subsidy, an operator had to carry crews two thirds of whom were United States citizens, and submit to certain investigatory and regulatory powers exercised by the commission. “Beginning in 1938, the Maritime Commission fostered a replacement program…which aimed to retire slow, obsolete craft at a rate of 50 ships a year….Under the forced draft of wartime, new construction was enormously increased. Yard capacity and the availability of shipyard workers• were the only effective limiting factors after the Pearl Harbor attack. By September 1942, 300 tankers and 2,000 standard-design Liberty• and Victory ships had been contracted for.” Sea Power, pp. 484-485

Technological Progress in the United States Navy “It is probable that the 15-year building holiday somewhat retarded advance in capital ship design. On the other hand, the North Carolina • and other battleships of the “new” battle line, launched shortly before and during World War II,… USS North Carolina (BB-55) fitting-out stage, 17 Apr 41 Brooklyn Navy Yard op. cit, p. 485

Technological Progress in the United States Navy “It is probable that the 15-year building holiday somewhat retarded advance in capital ship design. On the other hand, the North Carolina • and other battleships of the “new” battle line, launched shortly before and during World War II, represented an enormous advance over the West Virginia (1923)•, last of the treaty ships. The North Carolina was seven knots faster and possessed superior armor and much improved fire control. She also of course had a very much bigger and more effective antiaircraft battery. Other naval types made a more than commensurate advance. USS West Virginia (BB-48) in San Francisco Bay, ca., 1934 Ordered:! 5 December 1916! Builder:! Newport News Shipbuilding! Laid down:! 12 April 1920! Launched:! 19 November 1921! op. cit, p. 485

Technological Progress in the United States Navy “It is probable that the 15-year building holiday somewhat retarded advance in capital ship design. On the other hand, the North Carolina • and other battleships of the “new” battle line, launched shortly before and during World War II, represented an enormous advance over the West Virginia (1923)•, last of the treaty ships. The North Carolina was seven knots faster and possessed superior armor and much improved fire control. She also of course had a very much bigger and more effective antiaircraft battery. Other naval types made a more than commensurate advance. “In 1919-21 the collier Jupiter • U S S JUPITER MARE ISLAND, CAL. ! OCTOBER 13, 1918 op. cit, p. 485

Technological Progress in the United States Navy “It is probable that the 15-year building holiday somewhat retarded advance in capital ship design. On the other hand, the North Carolina • and other battleships of the “new” battle line, launched shortly before and during World War II, represented an enormous advance over the West Virginia (1923)•, last of the treaty ships. The North Carolina was seven knots faster and possessed superior armor and much improved fire control. She also of course had a very much bigger and more effective antiaircraft battery. Other naval Jupiter a more than commensurate advance. types madeunder conversion “In 1919-21 the collier Jupiter • was converted into the Langley • (19,360 tons), the first United States Navy aircraft carrier. Ordered:! 5 December 1916! Builder:! Newport News Shipbuilding! Laid down:! 12 April 1920! Launched:! 19 November 1921! USS Langley, CV-1 op. cit, p. 485

Technological Progress in the United States Navy USS Lexington (CV-2)! Ordered:! 1916 (as battlecruiser)! 1922 (as aircraft carrier)! Builder:! Fore River Ship and Engine Building Co., Quincy, Massachusetts! Laid down:! 8 January 1921! ! Launched:! 3 October 1925! ! Commissioned:! 14 December 1927! under conversion ! Reclassified:! As aircraft carrier, 1 July 1922! “It is probable that the 15-year building holiday somewhat retarded advance in capital Struck:! ship design. On the other hand, the North Carolina • and other battleships of the “new” 24 June 1942! Identification:! battle line, launched shortly before and during World War II, represented an enormous Hull number: CC-1, then CV-2! Nickname:! advance over the West Virginia (1923)•, last of the treaty ships. The North Carolina was "Lady Lex"! Fate:! seven knots faster and possessed superior armor and much improved fire control. She Sunk during the Battle of the Coral Sea, 8 May 1942! also of course had a very much bigger and more effective antiaircraft battery. Other naval types made a more than commensurate advance. “In 1919-21 the collier Jupiter • was converted into the Langley • (19,360 tons), the first United States Navy aircraft carrier. Two battle cruiser hulls, which otherwise would have been scrapped under the Washington Treaty, were converted to the 33,000-ton Lexington •… ! op. cit, p. 485

USS Saratoga (CV-3)! Ordered:! 1917 (as battlecruiser)! 1922 (as aircraft carrier)! Builder:! New York Shipbuilding Corporation, Camden, New Jersey! Laid down:! 25 September 1920! Technological Progress in the United States Navy ! Launched:! 7 April 1925! ! “It is probable that the 15-year building holiday somewhat retarded advance in capital ! ship design. On the other hand, the North Carolina • and other battleships of the “new” Reclassified:! battle line, launched shortly before and during World War II, represented an enormous 1 July 1922 to aircraft carrier! ! advance over the West Virginia (1923)•, last of the treaty ships. The North Carolina was Struck:! 15 August 1946! USS North Carolina (BB-55) seven fitting-out stage, and 41 Identification:! knots faster 17 Apr possessed superior armor and much improved fire control. She Hull number: CC-3, then CV-3! Brooklyn Navy very much bigger and more effective antiaircraft battery. Other naval also Nickname:! of course had aYard Sara Maru, Sister Sara! types Honors and! made a more than commensurate advance. awards:! 8 battle stars!“In 1919-21 the collier Jupiter • was converted into the Langley • (19,360 tons), the Fate:! first United States Navy aircraft carrier. Two USS West Virginia (BB-48) battle cruiser hulls, which otherwise would Sunk by atomic bomb test, 25 July 1946! San Francisco Bay, ca., 1934 have been scrapped under the Washingtonin Treaty, were converted to the 33,000-ton Lexington • and Saratoga •, commissioned in 1928. It was on the flight decks of these three vessels that the operational techniques were worked out that were to make the United States Navy’s air arm the world’s finest. By December 7, 1941, as we have seen, America had seven carriers in commission, and eleven more on the ways. Commissioned:! 16 November 1927! op. cit, p. 485

Technological Progress in the United States Navy “The U.S. submarine service was expanded between the wars. The new and larger “fleet boats” were in the late 1930’s already rendering obsolete the dependable old S-boats.• Improved submarine rescue devices and methods were perfected. Antisubmarine methods were the subject of a continuing research and development (R & D) program. ! USS S-44 built 1924 Ibid.

Technological Progress in the United States Navy “The U.S. submarine service was expanded between the wars. The new and larger “fleet boats” were in the late 1930’s already rendering obsolete the dependable old S-boats.• Improved submarine rescue devices and methods were perfected. Antisubmarine methods were the subject of a continuing research and development (R & D) program. ! Ibid. 9 V-boats were built, 1919-1934

Technological Progress in the United States Navy “The U.S. submarine service was expanded between the wars. The new and larger “fleet boats” were in the late 1930’s already rendering obsolete the dependable old S-boats.• Improved submarine rescue devices and methods were perfected. Antisubmarine methods were the subject of a continuing research and development (R & D) program. ! Tambor class fleet boat, 1939-1941 Ibid.

Technological Progress in the United States Navy “The U.S. submarine service was expanded between the wars. The new and larger “fleet boats” were in the late 1930’s already rendering obsolete the dependable old S-boats.• Improved submarine rescue devices and methods were perfected. Antisubmarine methods were the subject of a continuing research and development (R & D) program. ! Gato class fleet boat, 1940-1944 77 built Ibid.

Technological Progress in the United States Navy “The U.S. submarine service was expanded between the wars. The new and larger “fleet boats” were in the late 1930’s already rendering obsolete the dependable old S-boats.• Improved submarine rescue devices and methods were perfected. Antisubmarine methods were the subject of a continuing research and development (R & D) program. ! “Other scientific advances changed standard tactics in important ways. Complete conversion of the U.S. fleet to oil fuel shortly after World War I led to the building of high speed naval tankers and an effective technique for fueling at sea.•… Ibid.

Technological Progress in the United States Navy “The U.S. submarine service was expanded between the wars. The new and larger “fleet boats” were in the late 1930’s already rendering obsolete the dependable old S-boats.• Improved submarine rescue devices and methods were perfected. Antisubmarine methods were the subject of a continuing research and development (R & D) program. ! “Other scientific advances changed standard tactics in important ways. Complete conversion of the U.S. fleet to oil fuel shortly after World War I led to the building of high speed naval tankers and an effective technique for fueling at sea.• This in turn expanded the possible radius of action of the fleet, no longer dependent on closely spaced coal deposits. Carrier aircraft and long-range naval reconnaissance planes effectively took over the traditional scouting role of cruisers. Much improved radio communication promised to increase effective operational control by the higher echelons of command.” Ibid.

Text III. The March of Fascist Aggression members of Hitler’s Reichstag give one another “the German Greeting”

The Collective Security System “Throughout the between-wars period the diplomacy of the western democracies aimed at providing a collective security system “The cornerstone…was…enforcement of the Versailles Treaty which undertook to insure the permanent disarmament of Germany, and the strengthening of the League of Nations.” Mar 1919-French President Clemenceau coined the term “cordon sanitaire” to describe his alliance system to block Soviet expansion. France concluded defense treaties with the new states along the Soviet western border Ibid.

The Collective Security System “Throughout the between-wars period the diplomacy of the western democracies aimed at providing a collective security system “The cornerstone…was…enforcement of the Versailles Treaty which undertook to insure the permanent disarmament of Germany, and the strengthening of the League of Nations.” Mar 1919-French President Clemenceau coined the term “cordon sanitaire” to describe his alliance system to block Soviet expansion. France concluded defense treaties with the new states along the Soviet western border 1924-a similar French attempt at collective security was the so-called “Little Entente,” a series of bilateral treaties with middle European successor states aimed at checking ambitions of •Germany, Austria or Hungary : • Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Romania G Cz A H R Y Ibid.

“Joint international action was the order of the day. Besides the disarmament conferences described above, there were conferences on war debts and reparations, treaties of conciliation and commerce. Germany entered the League after the Locarno Treaties (1924). Even Communist Russia, outcast among nations, was at the behest of France admitted to the League in 1933. Through the 1920s, there seemed no good reason to think a new war inevitable…. “But the apparent stability was extremely temporary. To Britain, France, and the United States, the status quo was satisfactory. For that very reason, their diplomacy was passive, and as the following decade was to show, comparatively impotent. They failed to take effective joint action, and as war loomed nearer and nearer, their inadequate armaments and pacifistic populations emboldened the dictator-states to make more and more brazen demands…. “Japan, Germany, and Italy, the self-styled “have-not” nations, nationalistic, imperialistic, and opportunistic, came to assume the dynamic roles in the history of the 1930s. They were not satisfied with the status quo, and were prepared top risk war to remold their corners of the world. “The proximate causes of the aggressions of the Fascist countries in the 1930s may well be the alleged “injustices” of the Versailles Treaty (in the case of Germany), and the Great Depression that by destroying the means of livelihood of millions of men made them ready to follow any demagogue. But the deep-rooted underlying causes were the grandiose national objectives of Germany, Italy, and Japan—….” op. cit., p. 486

“In a sense, World War II may be said to have begun on September 18, 1931…”-Sea Power, p. 486 junior Japanese army officers staged a terrorist incident on the Japanese-controlled South Manchurian Railway Japanese newspaper photo of the bomb “damage”

“In a sense, World War II may be said to have begun on September 18, 1931…”-Sea Power, p. 486 junior Japanese army officers staged a terrorist incident on the Japanese-controlled South Manchurian Railway 1906-Japan had gotten this foothold after the Russo-Japanese War South Manchurian Railway

“In a sense, World War II may be said to have begun on September 18, 1931…”-Sea Power, p. 486 junior Japanese army officers staged a terrorist incident on the Japanese-controlled South Manchurian Railway 1906-Japan had gotten this foothold after the Russo-Japanese War 19 September-troops from neighboring Korea (a Japanese possession since 1910) invaded Manchuria.

“In a sense, World War II may be said to have begun on September 18, 1931…”-Sea Power, p. 486 junior Japanese army officers staged a terrorist incident on the Japanese-controlled South Manchurian Railway 1906-Japan had gotten this foothold after the Russo-Japanese War 19 September-troops from neighboring Korea (a Japanese possession since 1910) invaded Manchuria.

“In a sense, World War II may be said to have begun on September 18, 1931…”-Sea Power, p. 486 junior Japanese army officers staged a terrorist incident on the Japanese-controlled South Manchurian Railway 1906-Japan had gotten this foothold after the Russo-Japanese War 19 September-troops from neighboring Korea (a Japanese possession since 1910) invaded Manchuria. China protested and appealed to the League of Nations

“In a sense, World War II may be said to have begun on September 18, 1931…”-Sea Power, p. 486 junior Japanese army officers staged a terrorist incident on the Japanese-controlled South Manchurian Railway 1906-Japan had gotten this foothold after the Russo-Japanese War 19 September-troops from neighboring Korea (a Japanese possession since 1910) invaded Manchuria. China protested and appealed to the League of Nations the Chinese army made little resistance while Japan sent experts to “prove” Chinese culpability for the incident

“In a sense, World War II may be said to have begun on September 18, 1931…”-Sea Power, p. 486 junior Japanese army officers staged a terrorist incident on the Japanese-controlled South Manchurian Railway 1906-Japan had gotten this foothold after the Russo-Japanese War 19 September-troops from neighboring Korea (a Japanese possession since 1910) invaded Manchuria. China protested and appealed to the League of Nations the Chinese army made little resistance while Japan sent experts to “prove” Chinese culpability for the incident 7 Jan 1932-US Secty of State Henry Stimson proclaimed the Stimson Doctrine—the US would not recognize any state created by the Japanese aggression

“In a sense, World War II may be said to have begun on September 18, 1931…”-Sea Power, p. 486 junior Japanese army officers staged a terrorist incident on the Japanese-controlled South Manchurian Railway 1906-Japan had gotten this foothold after the Russo-Japanese War 19 September-troops from neighboring Korea (a Japanese possession since 1910) invaded Manchuria. China protested and appealed to the League of Nations the Chinese army made little resistance while Japan sent experts to “prove” Chinese culpability for the incident 7 Jan 1932-US Secty of State Henry Stimson proclaimed the Stimson Doctrine—the US would not recognize any state created by the Japanese aggression Mar 32-Japan created the state of Manchukuo and made Pu Yi, the last Chinese emperor, their puppet ruler.

“In a sense, World War II may be said to have begun on September 18, 1931…”-Sea Power, p. 486 junior Japanese army officers staged a terrorist incident on the Japanese-controlled South Manchurian Railway 1906-Japan had gotten this foothold after the Russo-Japanese War 19 September-troops from neighboring Korea (a Japanese possession since 1910) invaded Manchuria. China protested and appealed to the League of Nations the Chinese army made little resistance while Japan sent experts to “prove” Chinese culpability for the incident 7 Jan 1932-US Secty of State henry Stimson proclaimed the Stimson Doctrine—the US would not recognize any state created by the Japanese aggression Mar 32-Japan created the state of Manchukuo and made Pu Yi, the last Chinese emperor their puppet ruler. Then of the League Japan marched out

“In a sense, World War II may be said to have begun on September 18, 1931…”-Sea Power, p. 486 junior Japanese army officers staged a terrorist incident on the Japanese-controlled South Manchurian Railway 1906-Japan had gotten this foothold after the Russo-Japanese War 19 September-troops from neighboring Korea (a Japanese possession since 1910) invaded Manchuria. China protested and appealed to the League of Nations the Chinese army made little resistance while Japan sent experts to “prove” Chinese culpability for the incident 7 Jan 1932-US Secty of State Henry Stimson proclaimed the Stimson Doctrine—the US would not recognize any state created by the Japanese aggression Mar 32-Japan created the state of Manchukuo and made Pu Yi, the last Chinese emperor their puppet ruler. Then Japan marched out of the League 2 Oct 32-the Lytton Report rejected the Japanese claim of self-defense though it didn’t state that Japan had staged the incident “The failure of the democracies to cope with this treaty-breaking threat to the general peace was a lesson not lost on Mussolini and Hitler.” Ibid.

(Korea)

(Korea)

(Korea)

A museum in China today commemorating September 18th Who else remembers? (Korea)

Konstantin v. Neurath Germany’s Foreign Minister (1932-1938) makes a fateful announcement to the world During the early days of Hitler's rule, Neurath lent an aura of respectability to Hitler's expansionist foreign policy.— Wikipedia

Germany’s new Chancellor proudly reports his decision to the German Volk

14 October 1933—Germany Withdraws from the League and the Disarmament Conference “…in summing up the year, it may be said that while the [English] nation as a whole condemned Hitlerism, with its treatment of the Jews, its militarism, and regimentation of national life, and while each of the different political parties condemned Germany’s withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference, nevertheless, among nearly all groups the dominating desire was still directed toward achieving disarmament. With some it was for economic reasons; with others, because of the hope that they placed in the Disarmament Conference. But in the country as a whole, it was due to the fact that England, in the year of 1933, was pacifist as it never was before and probably never will be again…. “We stated before that men’s ideas change slowly and that a nation’s ideas change even more slowly. It takes shocks—hard shocks—to change a nation’s psychology. Let us turn to 1934 and see whether the leaders or external forces would give England the necessary jolts to move her from this Utopian pacifism.” Kennedy, Why England Slept, pp. 55-57.

Chap. IV “Beginnings of the Shift from Disarmament to Rearmament, 1934” Kennedy, Why England Slept Kennedy, Why England Slept, pp. 69-70.

Chap. IV “Beginnings of the Shift from Disarmament to Rearmament, 1934” “The Commons debates in July indicate the feelings of the different groups clearer than any others. Hope had finally vanished in re

Add a comment

Related presentations

Related pages

Military history of the United States during World War II ...

... (a technique the US Navy already ... of war on Japan before a joint session of Congress ... World War II Story of the U.S. Navy's ...
Read more

HyperWar: U.S. Navy in World War II - ibiblio

History of the United States Navy in World War II. Includes lists by type and class, descriptions, histories, ... Other US Navy Histories;
Read more

WAVES, World War II

WAVES, World War II. ... US Navy General Order No. 4 ... United States Statutes at Large Containing the Laws and Concurrent Resolutions Enacted During the ...
Read more

United States Navy operations during World War I ...

United States Navy operations during World War I began on April 6, ... US Naval Institute Press. ... World War II; 2nd Battle of the Atlantic;
Read more

Navy.mil The Official Website of the United States Navy ...

Navy News Service Top Stories Top Stories RSS Feed DoD Releases 2016 Basic Allowance for Housing Rates . The Department of Defense has released the 2016 ...
Read more

World War 2 Photos - US Navy - WW2 in Color

Pictures of the US Navy taken during World War II. Public domain World War II pictures. Login | Register | Contact | RSS | ... US Coast Guard; US Marines ...
Read more

WWII Navy Pilot: WW II (1939-45) | eBay

Excellent condition WWII NAVY MARINE PILOT SHIRT SIZE ... WW 2 US Navy Pilot Uniform jacket , ... WW II "STERLING" Marked 1 1/2" Silver Finsihed Navy ...
Read more

The United States Navy in the Pacific War 1941 -- 1945 ...

... but it is "The Pacific War: The U.S. Navy". ... to the overall victory that ended World War II. ... to win the war in the Pacific. Contributor ...
Read more

Roosevelt began new destroyer build program in 1935; old ...

Ships and Aircraft of World War II(many photos from U.S. Navy WW 2 ... 4-stack destroyers were stripped ... tell the rest of us which ...
Read more

Japanese Navy saved lives of British Navy in WW II - 2/2 ...

Japanese Navy saved lives of British Navy in WW II ... Japanese Navy saved lives of British Navy in WW II ... (US Navy Destroyer) ...
Read more