MTCRbrief19May03 Isby

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Information about MTCRbrief19May03 Isby

Published on October 15, 2007

Author: Reva


Missile Defense and Barriers to Proliferation: The International Code of Conduct, MTCR and the Yemeni Scuds :  Missile Defense and Barriers to Proliferation: The International Code of Conduct, MTCR and the Yemeni Scuds David C. Isby Senior Analyst, SPARTA Inc., 19 May 2003 Copyright, © 2003 by David C. Isby. DISCLAIMER: All statements of fact or opinion herein are those of the briefer and do not reflect those of SPARTA Inc. or any of its clients. ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS:  ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ACT Arms Control Today ASCM anti-ship cruise missile ASoSNP Assistant Secretary of State for Non Proliferation. BM ballistic missiles CBM confidence building measures CEIP Carnegie Endowment for International Peace DD Disarmament Diplomacy Dev development DPRK N. Korea GSN Global Security Newswire Ind India Isr Israel JMR Jane’s Missiles & Rockets JS John Schlosser, Dir OECC, 11/12/02 JW Testimony of John Wolf, Senate Government Affairs Committee, 6/6/02 JW1 John Wolf, CEIP, 15/11/02 LACM Land attack cruise missiles LS Testimony of Leonard Spector, Senate Government Affairs Committee, 6/6/02. MS Mark Smith NW Amb. Norman Wulf, 20./5/.02 Org organization P5 Permanent 5 UNSC members Pak Pakistan PRC People’s Republic of China! RS Testimony of Richard Spieir, Senate Government Affairs Committee, 5/6/97 SLV space launch vehicle. TBM theater ballistic missile WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction UAV unmanned air vehicles VVD Testimony of Vann Van Diepen, Senate Government Affairs Committee 29/7/02. MISSILE NON-PROLIFERATION – A US POLICY PRIORITY:  MISSILE NON-PROLIFERATION – A US POLICY PRIORITY The US is committed to missile non-proliferation as a major element of national security policy. (JS1) “Not just one of many issues in US policy but, as the President and many others have said, it is a cardinal issue”. (JW). Iraq case – key lessons. Reflected both in bilateral relations and participation in multilateral organizations & efforts. (JS1, JW) Missile proliferation linked to WMD (MS, ACT, 7-8/02) There have been some successes in missile non-proliferation, especially since the end of the Cold War. (ended programs, a lot of potential threats not there today). Recent changes – updates to the MTCR and the drafting of the Code of Conduct – have the potential to help. But multilateral non-proliferation alone cannot remove threat. But non-proliferation is going to get harder, not easier, as technology spreads and nature of MTCR changes (from small united group to more inclusive one with diverse goals). Non-proliferation cannot be considered as a substitute for MD. Rather, it is part of a full-spectrum response to a critical threat. Both are interdependent. While non-proliferation is valuable in limiting threats, danger exists that reliance may be counterproductive. It cannot substitute for active defenses. MISSLE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR):  MISSLE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR) An export control regime for critical missile technologies. Non-treaty arrangement dating from 87. “Focal pt. of intl efforts to curb the spread of missiles & missile technologies”. (NW) One of 4 multilateral export control regimes: Nuclear Suppliers Group, Australia Group, Wassenaar agreement. Bush – National Strategy to Combat WMD calls for strengthening, recognizes limits. Key rules– strong presumption to deny Cat I exports (supplier resp for end use), strong presumption to deny WMD capable exports, prohibition against exporting production capability. [Category I Systems – 500 kg payload/300 km range. Inc. technology, prod. equip., major components.] (RS p.33). Past successes – have major suppliers control exports, some eliminate BM programs (6) & forces, halt shipments, outreach to others. Guidelines & Annex are international standards. (VVD) MTCR viewed with suspicion as unfair by some (PRC, Ind)(MS DD 12/02). Establishes norms against transfer of missiles but not the missiles themselves (have-have not dichotomy). Rests almost totally on supply-side controls (so reserves the market for those willing to ignore the controls, e.g. DPRK). SLV inclusion likely to be an issue in future. MTCR’S 33 MEMBERS:  MTCR’S 33 MEMBERS Argentina Australia Austria Belgium Brazil Canada Czech Republic Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Italy Japan Korea, Republic of Luxembourg The Netherlands New Zealand Norway Poland Portugal Russia South Africa Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey Ukraine UK US (source: MTCR web site) 2002 CHANGES – MTCR, ICOC & PRC:  2002 CHANGES – MTCR, ICOC & PRC No specific plan in place to change despite Bush call for strengthening. MTCR – changes require consent of all 33 members. MTCR “New focus – limiting the risk of controlled items falling into the hands of terrorists” (JW1) Will “study” how guidelines can be changed to reflect this ( MTCR Revised definition of range & payload to close loopholes for LACMs- more realistic (“Black Shaheen” issue). Spread of UAVs force change (GSN 29/10/02, ACT 11/02). MTCR – new chair to continue outreach to non-members. (including DPRK). MTCR & ICOC “support G-8 agreement on Global Partnerships.” (JW1) PRC - new “significant” export control regulations & an extended control list. (GSN 3/9/02) (PRC is not a MTCR member but in 91 agreed to abide by MTCR’s original 87 guidelines & parameters). Includes MTCR’s “presumption of denial”. Enforcement of regulations not yet demonstrated. Issue of PRC-Pakistan proliferation links and exports to DPRK. THE HAGUE INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT (ICOC):  THE HAGUE INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT (ICOC) Launched 11/02. 93 countries. Political (not legal) agreement. CBMs: signatories to declare BM program annually and announce tests. US supports. No cooperation call, mechanism, rewards, strength. (MS DD 12/02, GSN 15/2/02). Brazil (MTCR), Ind, Pak do not sign, cite SLV wants. (& Isr.) Libya signs. Argentina wants SLV tech but signs. (MS DD 12/02). To have rotating chair, minimal org. Does not fill in what is seen as lack in MTCR – lack of formal status, no enforcement or compliance powers, reliant on national sanctions. (MS, “Efficiency & Inefficiency”) USoSADIS John Bolton: US places “great value” on ICOC and “high confidence in its future potential”. “It is no secret that the ICOC has its limitations”. US understands ICOC “commitment as not limiting our rights to take steps”. Russia proposed alternative, Global Control System. PRC & Iran back UN Working Group. (GSN 15/2/02) Text & signatories: see VALUE OF MULTILATERAL NON-PROLIFERATION REGIMES:  VALUE OF MULTILATERAL NON-PROLIFERATION REGIMES Provide common standard to facilitate international cooperation. International norms – benchmark of own nations and others. As part of an overall nonproliferation approach, make it more difficult, costly and time consuming [but not impossible] to develop missiles. Facilitate cooperation between like-minded states [raises issue of when non-like minded states in MTCR/ICOC]. Demonstrate international resolve & concern. MTCR – outreach to non-members. Code of Conduct has potential for US to apply bilateral incentives to scrap BMs as with potential NATO members. (JMR 8/02 p.8) Identifies Interdiction, Sanctions, Positive Measures among “other tools”. [Ability to do counter-proliferation, missile defense are also ‘tools’.] Source: JW1 [comments by briefer in brackets] LIMITATIONS OF MULTILATERAL NONPROLIFERATION REGIMES:  LIMITATIONS OF MULTILATERAL NONPROLIFERATION REGIMES Measures possible under both MTCR and ICOC limited. Critics claim MTCR “discriminatory” – the P5 has all the ICBMs & SLBMs! Lack of specific incentives to join. Code may instead spread BM “more rapidly’ – Richard Speier (GSN 15/2/02). May, like MTCR, open up proliferation between members. (GSN 15/2/02) MTCR/Code divergence. (GSN 15/2/02) No single std/authority. DPRK, Iran, Syria, India-Pakistan unlikely to participate. (GSN 15/2/02) MTCR could not limit/prevent the TD-1/2 threat. Could limit MD exports. Emerging as “secondary proliferates” not there in first 15 years of MTCR. (JS) Russia “unwise exports…turns blind eye…technically in compliance”(LS) “Russia is an active proliferator. They are part of the problem. They are selling and assisting countries like Iran and North Korea” – Donald Rumsfeld, 15/2/01 MTCR membership exempts from some US sanctions. (RS p.35) MTCR cannot expel members. (LS) “A birthday part where everybody gets to come”. (RS p.46). Countries members before able to enforce & implement controls for diplomatic reasons.s Missile proliferation intractable – not feasible to put together strong, effective multilateral control due to multiple concerns, inc. non-participation & SLVs. (MS DD 12/02). Problem not ltd to those outside intl norms. MULTILATERAL NONPROLIFERATION REGIME COMPLIANCE ISSUES:  MULTILATERAL NONPROLIFERATION REGIME COMPLIANCE ISSUES Any non-proliferation regime is limited by (a) the ability to track proliferation (b) the political will to act against proliferates(GSN 15/2/02). US called attention to Russia non-compliance with MTCR at “highest political level”. Imposed sanctions on firms, spent millions on training, but still problem (LS). Clinton Administration much less willing. (RS, p.29) PRC has “failed to implement” MTCR-compliant commitments (e.g., Pak export) Sanctions in 01/02 (JW). Russia looking to export missiles it claims are MTCR-compliant. e.g., Iskander-E TBM, BrahMos ASCM (dev w/Ind)(JMR 1/02 p.7, 2/03 p.13) Some CBMs already in place: Ind-Pak test notify. Lots of incentive to export control from existing goals (desire for trade, membership)(MS DD 12/02). Exports of BM/SLV technology from MTCR members has been termed a “wild card” enabling faster than projected development of threats (RS, p. 35). Multilateral export control regimes not required to share information, esp. denials. “Tightening regimes and improved enforcement are part of the answer, but again they are not sufficient”. – (JW1) NONPROLIFERATION & MISSILE DEFENSE: WORKING THE PROBLEM:  NONPROLIFERATION & MISSILE DEFENSE: WORKING THE PROBLEM MD protects US against those countries or entities that do not abide by international norms (as reflected in MTCR & ICOC). This includes DPRK-Iran-Syria proliferation. A strong nonproliferation effort contributes to international support and acceptance of MD – now apparent aimed at defense against limited number of threats. Similar to opposition to violation of 1972 BWC (Iraq, DPRK, Iran, Libya Cuba) and NPT (1968). Despite the importance of non-proliferation, it remains “one issue among many” (JW1) to much of the world. This is seen in the 2002 US interdiction of DPRK-made Scud TBMs being sent on a Cambodian-flag merchant ship to Yemen & stopped by the Spanish Navy. Yet, Scuds had to be sent on their way, because of: Lack of international authority to retain them. Diplomatic realities of relations with Yemen and cooperation in the war on terror. The set of threats that MD must face is likely to: Remain large Be replenished and modernized from those evading/ignoring international norms. NON-PROLIFERATION & MISSILE DEFENSE: FACING THE FUTURE:  NON-PROLIFERATION & MISSILE DEFENSE: FACING THE FUTURE “Proliferation problem is getting worse, not better…more countries & entities aggressively pursuing, WMD, missile program…more potential suppliers…proliferates turning to each other for assistance…non-state terrorist groups are actively seeking unconventional, asymmetric capabilities. What’s missing in today’s international debate is some sense of outrage that norms are being violated”. – John S. Wolf, ASoSNP, CEIP, 15/2/02. We are not looking at the “Scud barrier” any more. Solid fuel TBM proliferation (e.g., PRC to Pakistan) Emergence of LR threats in multiple countries since 87. (NK, Iran, In, Pak, Iraq). No guarantee that MTCR able to repeat (limited) success of 87-03. MD defends against those outside international norms as set out in MTCR and ICOC. Non-proliferation helps MD by limiting the threats it must face. helping to increase international support as an acceptable counter to BM threats (important for issues such as basing, deployment etc). There is no substitute for MD when a threat is incoming, despite years of policy to avoid/reduce threat. CONCLUSION: MISSILE DEFENSE INTERDEPENDENT WITH NON-PROLIFERATION:  CONCLUSION: MISSILE DEFENSE INTERDEPENDENT WITH NON-PROLIFERATION “A successful non-proliferation regime could decrease the urgency of more and more advanced defenses, offense-defense technological challenge, time to obsolescence, numbers and types of threatening offensive missiles and diversity of likely adversaries. In turn, [missile] defenses take the pressure to be successful away from other measures. Neither non-proliferation nor missile defense should be left to address the problem alone when, together with other tools…each strengthens the other dramatically”. – Amb. David Smith, “The Limits of Diplomacy and the Need for a Full Spectrum Response”, in Ben Sheppard, ed., Ballistic Missile Proliferation, Jane’s Special Report, March 2000.

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