MCOR 384 Presentation Gallipoli

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Information about MCOR 384 Presentation Gallipoli

Published on November 23, 2007

Author: Cubemiddle


Slide1:  1 Amphibious Warfare Captain Jose A. Nicolas MCOR 384 Gallipoli: Historical Significance:  2 Gallipoli: Historical Significance Disaster which convinced British that amphibious operations were not practicable. Became primary subject for U.S. Marine Corps study of amphibious warfare before World War II. Slide3:  3 Slide4:  4 Why Dardanelles?:  5 Why Dardanelles? Western Front Deadlocked; flanking maneuver impossible for either side Strategic entrance to Southeastern Europe Relieve German pressure on Russia Controls Black Sea and free Russian Fleet Relieve Russia’s surplus of wheat Turks had been neutral caretakers of Dardanelles Key Personnel:  6 Key Personnel Winston Churchill 1st Lord of Admiralty Sir John Fisher 1st Sea Lord Vice Admiral Carden Fleet Commander Rear Admiral de Robeck Carden’s Replacement General Hamilton Land Commander General Hunter-Weston Commander Cape Helles assault General von Sanders German Commander Mustafa Kemal Turkish Division Commander Turkish Political Situation: Fall 1914:  7 Turkish Political Situation: Fall 1914 Turkey’s expansionist plans call for an invasion into Russia Aug 1914, Turkey still not sure on which side it should enter the war Allies and Central Powers were content to keep her neutral Internal strife made Turkey look to the outside for allies. Choice was between Britain and Germany Germans were logical tactical choice but not well liked by the Turks Turkish Political Situation: Fall 1914:  8 Turkish Political Situation: Fall 1914 British were suspect of Turkish government Warship incident sends Turkey over the edge Turkey needed to acquire warships of her own Russian fleet to the north; Greek fleet to the south Order for two vessels was placed in England Keels were laid and Turkish crews sent to England Turkish Political Situation: Fall 1914:  9 Turkish Political Situation: Fall 1914 Ship incident cont... Aug 1914, one ship was complete and other was almost ready Aug 3rd, Winston Churchill announced that he would not make delivery two ships requisitioned to the British Navy Indignation and disappointment money paid, crews were in England Germany makes good on Turkish loss: Goeben and Breslau Turkey and Germany:  10 Turkey and Germany Germany still didn’t want Turkey in the war. This changed following the Battle of Marne (Aug 1914), which halted first German onrush across France Short war was no longer evident Germany needed allies and needed Turkey in the war Although Turkey originally pursued a pact with Russia, it ultimately joined forces with Germany Turkey and Germany:  11 Turkey and Germany Germans close the Dardanelles Mines were laid, lighthouses extinguished, notices were put up on cliffs of blockage Interference with passage was considered an international incident and an act of war Turks had no advance warning of German activities Turkey and Germany:  12 Turkey and Germany Russia’s lifeline was cut October 29th, Goeben and Breslau steamed through Black Sea and on the 30th opened fire on Odessa, Sevastopol and Novorossik Oct 30th, Russian, British and French deliver 12 hour ultimatum to Turkey Unanswered ultimatum sets off hostilities Situation in Europe:  13 Situation in Europe Vast warfare in France overwhelmed all over 1 million Allied casualties in 3 months Trenches were dug for 350 miles from North Sea to Swiss Alps Time to consider another option Allied Courses of Action:  14 Allied Courses of Action 3 Strategic Courses of Action for the Allies COA1 Main Effort on the Western Front COA2 Launch Campaign into the Baltic region COA3 Launch Campaign into the Balkans Slide15:  15 2 1 3 Course of Action 1 Main Effort on the Western Front:  16 Course of Action 1 Main Effort on the Western Front Advantages Lines of logistics and communication Simple, one-dimensional warfare Allies currently control terrain from which to launch future attacks Disadvantages Current stalemate with no end in sight Untold number of future casualties Current tactics not achieving victory Slide17:  17 2 1 3 Course of Action 2 Launch Campaign into the Baltic region:  18 Course of Action 2 Launch Campaign into the Baltic region Advantages Relieve pressure on Western Front Gain Baltic States to Alliance Use Russian troops to land on German coast 90 mi. from Berlin Avoid costly Western Front offensive Disadvantages Requires defeating German fleet which controls Baltic Removes combat power away from Western front Slide19:  19 2 1 3 Course of Action 3 Launch Campaign into the Balkans:  20 Course of Action 3 Launch Campaign into the Balkans Advantages Removes pressure from Western Front Gains Balkan States to Alliance L/up w/ Russia through Black Sea Eliminates Turkey from war Fighting Turks instead of Germans Allies control Mediterranean Sea Avoid costly Western Front offensive Disadvantages Requires forcing Dardanelles Removes combat power from Western front Slide21:  21 2 1 3 Course of Action 3: Dardanelles:  22 Course of Action 3: Dardanelles Amphibious option exploits British superiority in naval power. First idea was to advance Greeks into the Balkans via land. British decision not to pull troops from France made this a purely naval operation. Lack of Agreement in British War Cabinet for conduct of the war. Campaign receives limited, lukewarm support outside of Admiralty. Strategic element of surprise lost when British naval bombardment of Gallipoli in late 1914 shows Allied interest/intentions in region. Operational Phases:  23 Operational Phases Four phases of the campaign: Phase I: Naval Phase February - 18 March Attempt to force Dardenelles, reduce forts with naval power only Phase II: First Landing 25 April - 05 Aug Initial landings and subsequent tactical stalemate Phase III: Second Landing 06 Aug - 23 November; Continued stalemate Phase IV: Withdrawal 23 Nov1915 - 09 Jan 1916 Orientation:  24 Orientation Description of Gallipoli Dardanelles 40 miles in length width varies from 4000 yards, to 4.5 miles to 1600 yards No tide but 5 knot current Narrows were primary target Turks built their primary defenses here Turkeys defense network 11 forts, 72 guns, torpedo tubes, minefield, net of wire mesh 9 lines of mines were laid in vicinity of Narrows Allied Situation: Original Naval Plan:  25 Allied Situation: Original Naval Plan 12 battleships, 6 cruisers, 16 destroyers, 6 subs plus more Attack forts from long distance Close with minesweepers Diversionary bombardment Straights kept open with patrolling PHASE I: Naval Attack:  26 PHASE I: Naval Attack Three phased attack: 1. Deliberate long range bombardment 2. Medium range bombardment 3. Overwhelming fire at very close range Minesweepers were to clear the channel up to entrance of straights under cover fire Remaining vessels held in reserve (Con’t) PHASE I: Naval Attack:  27 PHASE I: Naval Attack Slow bombardment continued all morning Forts didn’t fire back for some time Results of day were disappointing Needed to get in close and direct fire Turkish and German gunners withdrew to the North Weather constraints hampered further action PHASE I: Naval Attack:  28 PHASE I: Naval Attack British were elated “Constantinople in 14 days” Friction of battle ensues: Turkish soldiers regained confidence drove British from Kum Kale and Cape Helles with heavy rifle and shore battery fire Mobile guns proved hard to silence Minesweepers couldn’t get close without shore guns neutralized Battleships needed mines out of the way PHASE I: Naval Attack:  29 PHASE I: Naval Attack Under these conditions, British leadership began to hesitate. Civilian minesweeper crews were also a problem gunfire Stalemate gets Churchill impatient Attempts to penetrate the Narrows continue unsuccessfully Churchill pushes for a deliberate attack!! March 18, 1915:  30 March 18, 1915 Battle in narrow area Attack of Naval vessels against shore installations de Robeck launches assault up the Narrows Ships sustained minor damage, but the Turks are confused and “shell shocked” de Robeck commits his battleships Disorder Slide31:  31 Explosion?:  32 Explosion? Assault begins midday Bouvet, turned and exploded (sunk in 2 min) 639 drowned Thoughts of heavy shell striking her Turks started their attack again By 1600 guns were silent again At 1611 Inflexible took a mine Five minutes later, Irresistible was struck Explosion?:  33 Explosion? Three battleships out of action: Bouvet Inflexible Irresistible Ocean sent in to tow and also succumbs to explosion and is abandoned British are dumbfounded on cause of explosion (9) PRINCIPLES OF WAR:  34 (9) PRINCIPLES OF WAR MOOSEMUSS Turkish Army :  35 Turkish Army Troops, while fighting well, are considering surrender Ammunition is getting scarce All positions manned, but temptation to “retreat” increases Turks surprised when next attack never came Morale begins to boost British Navy began to think that they could not do it alone: Bring in the British (and Allied) Army uncertainty British Army :  36 Kitchener decides to bring in Hamilton actually appointed on March 12th Wasn’t given any specific guidance Initial Plan by Kitchener Army was to hold back until Navy made attack on the forts at the Narrows If this failed, he was to land on Gallipoli peninsula If successful, he was to hold with light garrison and advance on Constantinople British Army Orienting on the Enemy Commanders Intent or mission tactics British Army:  37 British Army Hamilton instructed that he could not fight on Asiatic side of Dardanelles Hamilton arrived at the Dardanelles on March 17th Witnessed the debacle on 18th (Naval attack) This is his sole reconnaissance of the area prior to the actual amphibious assault. General Situation: Midnight 18 March :  38 General Situation: Midnight 18 March Turks and the Germans at the Narrows preparing to make a desperate stand British and French battered but still powerful fleet Allied Commander-in-Chief arrived but without a plan or an Army What next? Hamilton’s Message to Kitchener:  39 Hamilton’s Message to Kitchener “I am most reluctantly driven to the conclusion that the straits are not likely to be forced by battleships…..if my troops are to take part, it will not take the subsidiary form anticipated. The Army’s part will be more than mere landing parties to destroy forts, it must be a deliberate and prepared military operation carried out at full strength so as to open a passage for the Navy.” Planning:  40 Planning Naval Command believes they can still force the straights Army convinced the Navy cannot Meeting concluded with agreement that nothing more was to be done by the fleet until the Army, now scattered throughout the Mediterranean, was assembled and ready to land. Question remains: Where to Land? Where to Land?:  41 Where to Land? Bulair Sulva Bay Gaba Tepe Cape Helles Kum Kale Phase II: The First Landing on Gallipoli:  42 Phase II: The First Landing on Gallipoli General Hamilton arrives Gallipoli and begins to plan the largest amphibious operation in the history of warfare. 75,000 men at his disposal 30,000 Australians and New Zealanders (ANZACs) 17,000 British 16,000 French 10,000 + British Naval personnel The Situation:  43 The Situation Confusion and friction immediately plague Hamilton’s operation: General’s staff still in England; Soldiers still at sea; No accurate maps of Gallipoli existed; No reliable intelligence about the enemy; No operational plan drafted; No decision where to land on the peninsula; No trench fighting equipment; Intelligence routinely compromised. The Mission:  44 The Mission The Landing Plan: Simple assault on the peninsula; The main striking force was to be the British division under Hunter-Weston at Cape Helles; Initial mission was to seize the high ground at Achi Baba by the day’s end; ANZAC’s will land simultaneously at Gaba Tepe and secure the Sari Bair hills; Hamilton’s intent was to cut off the Turks fighting in the southern peninsula from the other Turkish units. Main Effort Objective Terrain The Mission:  45 The Mission The Landing Plan (cont): A feint was to be made simultaneously at the Gulf of Saros; A diversionary landing at Kum Kale, on the Asian tip, would neutralize the guns firing on Cape Helles; By the second/third day of the operation, the peninsula would be secured enough to allow minesweepers to enter the Narrows. Situation: Germans/Turks:  46 Situation: Germans/Turks Marshal Liman von Sanders Cancelled the Turkish concept of trying to defend everywhere Tactically placed his six divisions 2 at Bulair; 1 at Cape Helles; 1 in reserve; 2 on the Asian side near Kum Kale Convinced the British would land at Bulair Slide47:  47 LINEAR OR DEFENSE IN DEPTH? Execution: 25 April 1915:  48 Execution: 25 April 1915 Assault begins at dawn Loading, assembly, and transport to the battle area went smoothly; Gaba Tepe: ANZACs land 1 mile north of original objective Most men wade ashore under gunfire; become tangled in a web of ravines and shrubs; Some exhausted soldiers scale the ridges and set their sites on the Narrows. Execution: 25 April 1915:  49 Execution: 25 April 1915 Mustafa Kemal: Takes command of the situation; Force marches his division to the sound of gunfire; Repels ANZACs on high ground; Disorganized troops retreat to beach; Casualties mount; Hamilton to Birdwood: “dig…dig…dig” Execution:  50 Execution Cape Helles: Plan to land 10,000 men on 5 separate beaches; Spearhead of the campaign; Turks survive naval bombardment and unleash fury of fire on the British 29th Division; V Beach a virtual massacre; General Hunter-Weston remains at sea: little tactical awareness of the situation; Few commanders take the initiative. Who is supporting whom? Main effort? 1 – Problems of the Tadpole 2 – Problems of command 3 – Influence of terrain and geography 4 – Chaotic and decentralized nature 5 – Development of technology Execution:  51 Execution Cape Helles (cont): Hamilton refuses to intervene; Navy considers evacuation; By midnight, British outnumbered enemy ashore by 6 to 1 No senior officer ashore to take control and move on the Turks for fear of a counter-attack Turks were in no position for counter-attack By day’s end, only Kum Kale in allied hands *Gain and maintain contact. * Develop the situation. *Exploit known enemy weaknesses * Concentrate superior combat power at the decisive time and place. * Seize or control key terrain. * Gain and retain the initiative. * Neutralize the enemy's ability to react. * Advance by fire and maneuver. * Maintain momentum. * Exploit success. * Provide for the security of the force. Execution:  52 Execution Hamilton realizes two sobering facts: Turks proved formidable foe; Flat trajectory of naval gunfire proved ineffective. Both sides engage in a race to entrench sound familiar...the Western front??? Stalemate encourages Navy to reconsider an attack up the Narrows. Hamilton decides to reinforce failure at Cape Helles by throwing more men into the fight. Stalemate Ensues:  53 Stalemate Ensues Churchill argues to reinforce Gallipoli with men and materiel: He argues that a stalemate along the Western front can’t be helped, but Gallipoli could be decisive; An advance to Achi Baba and Kalid Bahr could mean the realization of all objectives: Forcing the Narrows; Securing the Black Sea; Uniting forces with Russia Phase III: The Second Landing on Gallipoli:  54 Phase III: The Second Landing on Gallipoli By June, Kitchener (with consent from the newly formed Dardenelles Committee) concedes to Churchill’s way of thinking; Hamilton informed by July of more reinforcements (3 divisions); By end of July, Hamilton commands 120,000 Where and how to employ reinforcements? Planning:  55 Planning Hamilton ponders landing sites; Element of surprise certainly lost; Gulf of Saros brushed aside…..again! Viewed as too far from the concentration of naval forces. Main landing near Gaba Teppe and Sulva Bay Emphasis removed from Cape Helles and Achi Baba and placed upon Sari Bair ridge 6 August identified as D-day Execution:  56 Execution Near simultaneous attacks planned along peninsula: Sulva Bay ANZAC Beach Cape Helles Hamilton’s intent to cause mass Turkish confusion. Only confused troops were his own. No coordination between units; Many officers on the evening of 6 Aug still hadn’t seen a map of the area; Troops fire at any target Execution:  57 Execution Attack essentially defeated by the rugged countryside and poor leadership; Defense by well-dug-in Turks repel assault toward Sair Bair; Although ANZACs and Sulva Bay forces gain ground, mounting casualties dramatically slow momentum; The Times reports: “[Allied forces] have landed and dug another graveyard.” Turks ultimately counterattack and push forces back to the beaches…. Execution:  58 Execution Campaign ends for Hamilton on 17 October; An exhausting, close-quarter type of engagement of bullet swept beaches and hand-to-hand fighting; Mustafa Kemal drove his exhausted troops harder and faster than the Brits were driven; By Nov it was accepted as fact that the Brits would not win at Gallipoli; Both sides endure the loss of more than 250,000 men since April Phase IV: Withdrawal:  59 Phase IV: Withdrawal General Charles Monro takes command; Immediately assesses situation and recommends evacuation; Kitchener appalled; but reluctantly concedes. Admiral Keyes recommends another assault through the narrows; War Council approves only one plan: Retreat from Gallipoli; Bulgaria threatens to defeat Serbia and link forces with Germany. Amphibious Withdrawal Phase IV: Withdrawal:  60 Phase IV: Withdrawal In five nights, units withdrew on a carefully worked-out timetable; ANZACs and British deceive Turks as to the total number of troops on beach; Rifle and artillery fire continue throughout withdrawal; Turks too wary to conduct effective recon of beach. Withdrawal efforts begin in late Nov and end in early January, 1916. Aftermath and Lessons Learned:  61 Aftermath and Lessons Learned Constantinople campaign considered , in retrospect, one of the soundest strategic concepts of WWI; What if it succeeded? Would Russia be able to decisively mass manpower in the East? Would stocks of food surplus been released? Would stalemate on the Western front ended? Conclusion:  62 Conclusion Strategic potential squandered by incompetent leadership; Campaign resulted in the same stalemate it was intended to solve; Failure to exploit element of surprise: Intelligence grossly lacking; Naval gunfire a deciding factor? (the debate continues today). Conclusion:  63 Conclusion British conclude that amphibious operations are too difficult in the face of modern defenses; The greatest amphibious landing to date results in fiasco. However, it proved to be a textbook full of lessons on which the successful amphibious assaults during WWII and Marine Corps doctrine were based. Casualties: killed wounded Allied: 44,072 250,000? German/Turkish: 86,692 250,000? Slide64:  64

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