Published on November 15, 2007
Slide1: Intentionality and Biological Functions Ingvar Johansson, Institute for Formal Ontology and Medical Information Science, Saarbrücken 2004-10-06 Phenomenological Intentionality: Phenomenological Intentionality We can directly perceive things and persons. We can talk about such things and persons even when we do not perceive them. We can even talk about things and persons that do not, have not, and will never exist, i.e., about fictions. Three Kinds of Phenomenological Intentionality: Three Kinds of Phenomenological Intentionality Presentational Representational Fictional Mixed Phenomenological Intentionality: Mixed Phenomenological Intentionality He perceives the real moon. He reads about a real star. He is reading about a science fiction character. Intentionality and Immanent Realism: Intentionality and Immanent Realism Can all these intentional phenomena be fitted into an immanent realism? Yes! Can they be reduced to causal systems or biological functions? No! Looking through & Looking at: Looking through & Looking at We can both look at and look through lenses and telescopes. Looking through & Looking at: Looking through & Looking at We can both look at and “look through” concepts and sentences. Concepts are like lenses: Concepts are like lenses cat Katze katt Two Kinds of Representational Intentionality: Two Kinds of Representational Intentionality Representational and True Representational and False Fictional Intentional States and Acts (i): Intentional States and Acts (i) All intentional states and acts have “directedness”. All intentional states and acts have a “from-pole”. Presentational and representational intentional states and acts imply a “connection at a distance”. Intentional States and Acts (ii): Intentional States and Acts (ii) In immanent realism, this distance is always of a spatiotemporal nature. In Platonist realism, this distance can also be of a transcending nature. Fictional intentional states are directed neither at immanent nor at transcendent objects. Is there in fictional intentionality any object at all? Intentionality and Direction of Fit: Intentionality and Direction of Fit You see the table; you are in a cognitive state; your intentional state has a mind-to-world direction of fit. You desire food; you are in a conative state; your intentional state has a world-to-mind direction of fit. Movement and Direction of Fit: Movement and Direction of Fit Purposes and Goals: Purposes and Goals To have a purpose or goal is to be in an intentional state with a world-to-mind direction of fit. It may be satisfied or it may not. Normally, there is a temporal gap between the original existence of the intentional state with its purpose and its satisfaction/dissatisfaction. Purposes and goals are not causes or functions. Slide15: John Searle: “My own approach to mental states and events has been totally realistic in the sense that I think there really are such things as intrinsic mental phenomena which cannot be reduced to something else or eliminated by some kind of re-definition. There really are pains, tickles and itches, beliefs, fears, hopes, desires, perceptual experiences, experiences of acting, thoughts, feelings, and all the rest. Now you might think that such a claim was so obviously true as to be hardly worth making, but the amazing thing is that it is routinely denied, though usually in a disguised form, by many, perhaps most, of the advanced thinkers who write on these topics. I have seen it claimed that mental states can be entirely defined in terms of their causal relations, or that pains were nothing but machine table states of certain kinds of computer systems, or that correct attributions of Intentionality were simply a matter of predictive success to be gained by taking a certain kind of "intentional stance" toward systems. I don't think that any of these views are even close to the truth …” (Intentionality, p. 262.) Non-Human Biological Intentionality: Non-Human Biological Intentionality What about animals? They seem to be able both to perceive (to have cognition) and to have desires (to have conation). But at least some of them seem to lack phenomenological intentionality. Artificial Intentionality: Artificial Intentionality What about robots and computers? Robots have in some sense both cognition and conation. At least today they seem to lack phenomenological intentionality. Natural languages develop: Natural languages develop ‘Color’ can nowadays mean both (i) perceived phenomenological colors, and (ii) physical electromagnetic wavelengths. ‘Intentional states’ can nowadays mean both (i) phenomenological intentional states, and (ii) brain states, computer states, and robot states. Language users abbreviate: Language users abbreviate Sean Connery is (playing) James Bond. He is (identical with) the man I told you about. Surface colors are (caused by) electromagnetic waves. Surface colors are (caused by the reflection of) electromagnetic waves. Color perceptions are (caused by) brain states. Some causes can be regarded as representations (colors): Some causes can be regarded as representations (colors) Structure that reflects electromagnetic waves of certain wavelengths. Electromagnetic waves. Brain states Some causes can be regarded as representations (music): Some causes can be regarded as representations (music) Plastic gramophone records. Magnetic tape records. Digital compact disc records. Air vibrations. Brain states. AI-people abbreviate: AI-people abbreviate True: (Phenomenological) Intentional states are (caused by) brain states. True: (Phenomenological) Intentional states are (represented by) brain states. False: (Phenomenological) Intentional states are (identical with) brain states. Slide23: Features of representations must not be conflated with what is represented. Distinguish between phenomenological intentionality and causal-functional intentionality Phenomenological Intentionality and its Conditions of Existence: Phenomenological Intentionality and its Conditions of Existence There are both phenomenological and causal-functional intentionality in the ordinary spatiotemporal world. Phenomenological intentionality is in all probability dependent for its existence on representational causal-functional intentionality. Back to where we started: One in Many: Back to where we started: One in Many Six colored surfaces How many colors? Six particulars? (six instances of red?) One universal? (one redness?) How can One entity be in Many places simultaneously? Speech Acts: One in Many: Speech Acts: One in Many Six speech acts How many propositions? Six particulars? (six proposition-instances?) One universal? (one proposition?) How can One proposition be in Many places simultaneously? Ontology is fascinating. Ontology is fascinating. Ontology is fascinating. Ontology is fascinating. Ontology is fascinating. Ontology is fascinating. Earlier Endings: Earlier Endings No position on universals is completely free from problems, but immanent realism is by far the least problematic position. If immanent realism accepts the existence of internal relations, it can give a realist account of orderings and quantities. Immanent realism can accept the existence of process shapes, and it is compatible with the use of prototypical concepts. Earlier Endings: Earlier Endings 4. (a) The existence of constituent functions suffice to explain the objectivity of biological functions and functionings. (b) Constituent functions can be accounted for within the framework of immanent realism. Today’s End: Today’s End 5. (a) Intentional states of all kinds can be analyzed within immanent realism. (b) Meanings and propositions are immanent universals, too.