CS598STK Terra

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Information about CS598STK Terra
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Published on June 16, 2007

Author: Tarzen

Source: authorstream.com

Slashdot Treat:  Slashdot Treat Terra: A Virtual Machine-Based Platform for Trusted Computing:  Terra: A Virtual Machine-Based Platform for Trusted Computing Tal Garfinkel, Ben Pfaff, Jim Chow, Mendel Rosenblum, Dan Boneh (Stanford) SOSP’03 Presented by: Michael LeMay Introduction:  Introduction Outline:  Outline Standard Operating Systems:  Standard Operating Systems Closed-Box Platforms:  Closed-Box Platforms Example Closed Boxes:  Example Closed Boxes What is a closed-box, really?:  What is a closed-box, really? Terra Objectives:  Terra Objectives Realization:  Realization Terra Architecture:  Terra Architecture Trusted Platform Module:  Trusted Platform Module TPM Interconnection:  TPM Interconnection TPM 1.0 Components:  14 TPM 1.0 Components TCG 1.0 Architecture Overview Credential Types:  15 Credential Types TPM contains 5 types of credentials: Important: Endorsement or EK credential: uniquely identifies TPM, privacy concern Identity or AIK credential: Issued by privacy CA to preserve privacy of EK credential Not-so-important: Conformance credential: Certifies that TPM meets specifications Platform credential: Identifies TPM manufacturer and capabilities Validation credential: Associated with peripheral or software to guarantee integrity Threat Model:  Threat Model Remote Attestation:  Remote Attestation Linux Integrity Measurement:  Linux Integrity Measurement Linux Attestation:  Linux Attestation Linux Verification:  Linux Verification Terra Attestation Process:  Terra Attestation Process TVMM Attestation (cont.):  TVMM Attestation (cont.) Attestation Verification:  Attestation Verification Attestation Binding:  Attestation Binding Attestation Limitations:  Attestation Limitations Policy-Reduced Integrity Measurement Architecture:  Policy-Reduced Integrity Measurement Architecture JaegerSS 2006 Attestation Limitations (cont.):  Attestation Limitations (cont.) Attestation Limitations (cont.):  Attestation Limitations (cont.) Attestation Limitations (cont.):  Attestation Limitations (cont.) Attestation Limitations (cont.):  Attestation Limitations (cont.) Attestation Limitations (cont.):  Attestation Limitations (cont.) Management VM:  Management VM Driver Security:  Driver Security Security-Enhanced Xen:  Security-Enhanced Xen Security-Enhanced Xen (cont.):  Security-Enhanced Xen (cont.) http://www.xensource.com/files/xs0106_intel_xen_security.pdf, http://www.xensource.com/files/XenSecurity_SHand.pdf TPM Virtualization:  TPM Virtualization http://www.xensource.com/files/XenSecurity_Intel_CRozas.pdf Intel LaGrande:  Intel LaGrande Intel Trusted Execution Technology (TET):  Intel Trusted Execution Technology (TET) http://www.intel.com/technology/security/downloads/arch-overview.pdf TET System Architecture:  TET System Architecture TET System Implementation:  TET System Implementation http://download.intel.com/technology/security/downloads/31516803.pdf ARM TrustZone:  ARM TrustZone http://www.arm.com/products/esd/trustzone_home.html Microsoft NGSCB:  42 Microsoft NGSCB Microsoft, AMD, HP, IBM, Infineon, Intel, Sun, … all members of TCG Uses TPM to partition system into two parts: Nexus and L.H.S. NCAs: Nexus Comput- ing Agents Only two compartments NGSCB Architecture – WinHEC 2004:  43 NGSCB Architecture – WinHEC 2004 Windows Owns most HW Only real-time OS Security benefits via scenarios Compartments are Windows-based Significantly reduced footprint Strongly Isolated, hardened and armored Secure device ownership Nexus or service compartments Great device diversity Thousands of drivers MLOC Little device diversity Only a few drivers KLOC Biddle, 2004 Additional Questions:  Additional Questions Additional Questions (cont.):  Additional Questions (cont.) Conclusion:  Conclusion APPENDICES:  APPENDICES Attested Meter:  48 Attested Meter Distributed Energy Resource management Demand Reducation/Load Management Automated Meter Reading/Real Time Pricing Problem:  49 Problem For real-time pricing to work, power company has to know exactly how much power was used by each customer at each point in time Could be privacy problem User should be able to access consumer portal software on meter from local network We’re taking a closed-box platform, a meter, and adding an isolated open-box application Same thing suggested by Ravinder for Xbox Attested Meter Architecture:  Attested Meter Architecture Motivating Applications:  Motivating Applications Trusted Access Point:  Trusted Access Point High-Assurance Terminals:  High-Assurance Terminals Isolated Monitors:  Isolated Monitors Virtual Secure Coprocessors:  Virtual Secure Coprocessors Trusted Quake:  Trusted Quake SECURITY REQUIREMENTS:  SECURITY REQUIREMENTS Root Security:  Root Security Remote Attestation:  Remote Attestation Trusted Path:  Trusted Path PROPERTIES OF COMMODITY SYSTEMS:  PROPERTIES OF COMMODITY SYSTEMS Implications of Characteristics:  Implications of Characteristics TERRA DESIGN:  TERRA DESIGN TVMM Attestation:  64 VM TVMM Attestation Each layer of software has a keypair Lower layers certify higher layers Enables attestation of entire stack Hardware (TPM) Firmware Operating System Application Bootloader TVMM (Terra) Hash of Attestable Data Higher Public Key Other Application Data Signed by Lower Level Certificate Layers HARDWARE SUPPORT:  HARDWARE SUPPORT Required Hardware:  Required Hardware TPM Required Hardware (cont.):  Required Hardware (cont.) Required Hardware (cont.):  Required Hardware (cont.) TCG Layers:  69 TCG Layers http://trousers.sourceforge.net TPM 1.2:  TPM 1.2 Next Try TCG 1.2: Trustworthy or Treacherous? (warning: conspiratorial) Opposition:  71 Opposition Trusted Computing has many opponents, because it considers the computer operator to be a potential attacker: EFF: Trust Computing: Promise and Risk Against-TCPA LAFKON - A movie about Trusted Computing And, a rebuttal: TCPA Misinformation Rebuttal and Linux drivers Credential Relationships:  Credential Relationships DevID Relationship to TPM Credential Relationships (cont.):  Credential Relationships (cont.) TERRA IMPLEMENTATION:  TERRA IMPLEMENTATION Basic Implementation:  Basic Implementation Implementation Performance:  Implementation Performance SAMPLE APPLICATIONS - REVISITED:  SAMPLE APPLICATIONS - REVISITED Trusted Access Points:  78 Trusted Access Points VPN client can be implemented as closed-box VM and distributed to visitors when they first connect to a regulated network VM can attest to VPN gateway that it is operating properly, and will enforce intended traffic regulations TAP Benefits:  79 TAP Benefits Prevents source forgery: TAP can reliably check all outgoing packets Prevents DoS attacks: TAP can block DoS attacks at their source, before they even reach the network Scalability: Clients enforce regulations on their own traffic Network Scalability: TAP can perform local vulnerability scan on host before permitting it to connect Example #1:  80 Example #1 Online gaming: Quake Players often modify Quake to provide additional capabilities to their characters, or otherwise cheat Quake can be transformed into a closed-box VM and distributed to players Remote attestation shows that it is unmodified Very little performance degradation Covert channels remain, such as frame rate statistics Trusted Quake Assurances:  81 Trusted Quake Assurances Secure Communication: VM can’t be inspected, so shared key can be embedded in VM image to protect network communication Any software can be reverse engineered, so is this a good idea? Client Integrity: maps and media files are protected from modification on client Server Integrity: Bad clients can’t connect Trusted Quake Weaknesses:  82 Trusted Quake Weaknesses Bugs and Undesirable Features: Rendered polygon OSD permits prediction of impending character appearances Network DoS Attacks: Terra does nothing in this regard Out-of-Band Collusion: Players can still communicate if they’re sitting together in a basement or using IM ANALYSIS:  ANALYSIS Advantages of Terra:  Advantages of Terra Limitations of Terra:  Limitations of Terra RELATED WORK:  RELATED WORK

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