3 RI Agreements Politics PolicyMaking

70 %
30 %
Information about 3 RI Agreements Politics PolicyMaking
Education

Published on March 22, 2008

Author: iloor

Source: authorstream.com

Slide 1: Politics & Policy Making REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND COOPERATION UEES LECTURE 3: Regional Integration Agreements: Politics & Policy Making Prepared by: Ignacio W Loor, MIBA – Economist Slide 2: OUTLINE INTRODUCTION INTEGRATION FOR SECURITY Intra-regional security Extra-regional security INTEGRATION FOR BARGAINING POWER PROJECT COOPERATION INTEGRATION FOR LOCK-IN TO REFORM LOBBYING FOR INTEGRATION Slide 3: INTRODUCTION Regional Integration is good politics: it meets political needs and satisfies influential lobbies. The purpose of integration is often political, and the economic consequences are side effects of the political payoff. Sometimes the net effects will be highly favorable, but sometimes the illusion of gain collides with the reality of large costs and major redistributions. Political payoff may be worth it: If a country can substantially increase its security or lock in to democracy by joining a regional integration scheme. Sometimes the political benefits are ephemeral and the economic costs high. INTRODUCTION Slide 4: INTRAREGIONAL SECURITY 1 The politics that most concerned President Hallstein (president of first commission of the EEC) and his colleagues in building the EU was security. “To create, by establishing an economic community, the basis for broader and deeper community among peoples long divided by bloody conflicts” Argentine and Brazilian militaries had long perceived each other as potential threats; economic agreements meant to reduce tensions, and MERCOSUR reinforced this process. The political impetus was based on the belief that increasing trade would reduce the risk of intraregional conflict – Emanuel Kant´s Perpetual Peace (1795) Negotiations between political leaders on trade issues gradually build trust, so that elites learn to form cross-national coalitions for subsequent collaboration. Sometimes economic integration paves the way for full political integration. Unfortunately, the result that trade enhances security does not allow to conclude that policies that promote trade within a region will necessarily improve the prospects of regional peace; indeed, they may have the opposite effect when enhancing security is not the main concern. INTEGRATION FOR SECURITY Slide 5: INTRAREGIONAL SECURITY 2 Tariff preferences that induce regional trade can create powerful income transfers within the region and can lead to the concentration of industry in a single location. Countries or regions that lose income and industry can be sufficiently resentful that separatist movements arise and the overall risk of conflict is increased. A clear example of how trade preferences can trigger conflict was the American Civil War. Protective barriers also played a role in the conflict in which Ireland broke away from the Union of 1807 with Britain. These examples show that trade policy can redistribute income and produce outcomes that worsen intraregional security. The net effect depends upon the economic characteristics of the members of the region and upon the style and design of the integration arrangement. EU besides of promoting regional integration, avoided undesirable income transfers through a consensual negotiation style. INTEGRATION FOR SECURITY Slide 6: EXTRAREGIONAL SECURITY Political impetus for regional integration is sometimes not intraregional security, but the need to unite to face a common external threat. Common action in the economic sphere makes common action for security easier and more credible. For example the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was created partly in response to the potential threat of regional powers such as Iran and Iraq. ASEAN was motivated by a perceived need to stem the threat of spreading Communism. Sometimes regional integration combines the objectives of intraregional and external security. While there is evidence that induced regional integration is a two-edged sword with respect to intraregional security, there is too little evidence to evaluate the effects on extra-regional security. INTEGRATION FOR SECURITY Slide 7: INTEGRATION FOR BARGAINING POWER By joining together, the weak can become strong, just as workers band together in unions to increase their bargaining power against their employer. How important has the motive of solidarity been in RI, and how effective is solidarity in trade bargaining? Classic example is the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries OPEC. Another case is the desire for increased bargaining power by the EEC relative to US. How well might this result generalize to developing countries integration arrangements? LDC regional blocs do not negotiate as single entities in part because they hardly share economic interests; countries with common exports have achieved more. Good example of this is the Cairns Group (19 agricultural exporting countries). Potentially, regional blocs can achieve a common negotiating position by logrolling (vote trading) In trade bargaining, countries win gains from agreements by making concessions. In one important respect RI can reduce bargaining power of small countries (multinational firm and tax concession case) Slide 8: PROJECT COOPERATION Countries can benefit greatly from cooperation when they share resources such as rivers, fishing grounds, hydroelectric power, or rail connections, or when they join to overcome problems such as pollution and transport bottlenecks. Countries may be unwilling to cooperate because of national pride, political tensions, lack of trust, or asymmetric distribution of costs and benefits. Regional cooperation agreements are harder than national ones because of the absence of regional courts or authorities to enforce them. Regional integration has been crucial in achieving project cooperation in different regions, like the case of Southern African Development Community that created the Southern African Power Pool. Cooperation is intrinsically difficult because each country has incentive to underprovide expensive spare capacity, hoping to free-ride upon other´s spare capacity Thought the support from the international community is often crucial for the success of cooperation agreements, RI is likely to help by increasing trust between the parties. Slide 9: INTEGRATION FOR LOCK-IN TO REFORM Integration can help domestically, as a government seeks to implement its political agenda – Avoid reform plans to be reversed. Investors are confident when they feel reforms will persist. Governments often need institutions that enable them credibility to lock in to decisions; these are sometimes referred to as commitment mechanisms. How good are RI as commitment mechanisms? For trade liberalization they are successful because they are built upon reciprocal preferences. RI can be useful if they are used as the foundation of reciprocal behavior on which, not only trade, but other agreements are then built. Membership in a regional group is restricted to democracies. Enforceability of bloc rules depends on both the value of belonging to the bloc and the credibility of the threat of action if rules are broken. Credibility is achieved only if a country that breaks the rules is penalized by other members of the bloc. RI agreements may sometimes be more important for what they can do for the credibility of other policies, than for what they can do for trade policy. Slide 10: LOBBYING FOR INTEGRATION Government policymaking is likely to be shaped by the competing demands of different lobbies, which is why firms invest heavily in lobbying bureaucrats and politicians. Some interest groups will have much more influence than others will. Lobbying includes all attempts to influence legislators and officials, whether by other legislators, constituents or organized groups. Lobbies tend to promote policies that cause transfers from the many to the few. Producers competing against imports may be more influential than exporters. Some authors have argued that politically sustainable agreements tend to be those that are “trade diverting”, delivering minimal benefits to consumers. In a Regional Agreement, the binding – to the free trade – is reciprocal, and thus more acceptable to the lobbies that influence the political process. Slide 11: Source: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development http://www.oecdbookshop.org/oecd/index.asp?lang=EN Regional Integration and Developing Countries

Add a comment

Related presentations

Related pages

The Convention to Combat Desertification and the Role of ...

7KH &RQYHQWLRQ WR &RPEDW 'HVHUWLILFDWLRQ DQG WKH 5ROH RI ,QQRYDWLYH 3ROLF 0DNLQJ ... Global Environmental Politics 4:3, ... tal agreements, ...
Read more

Project MUSE - Democracy and Foreign Policy-Making in ...

... to review the country’s foreign policy and ratify international agreements signed ... 3 . How Indonesia ... politics on foreign policy-making ...
Read more

No. 236 Indonesia’s Democratic Politics and Foreign Policy ...

of Resolution No. 1803.3 ... and Foreign Policymaking, ... 5 See “RI Slammed over Iran Resolution, ...
Read more

THE GLOBAL NEWS NETWORKS AND U.S. POLICYMAKING IN DEFENSE ...

... negotiating and concluding agreements, ... policymaking. Great leaders may m ake the ri ght decision fast and ... Journal of Press/Politics, 3, ...
Read more

Promoting a National Policy for Agriculture and Rural Life

(OHPHQWV RI D 1DWLRQDO 3ROLF IRUPDWLRQ SURFHVV ... policymaking is restricted to a ... The document “The Politics of Public Policies” (2005) ...
Read more

Regional cooperation, patronage and the ASEAN Agreement on ...

... forests and policymaking in Indonesia (pp. 221 ... RI missing out on ASEAN haze agreement ... International Environmental Agreements: Politics, ...
Read more

Differences That Matter: Canada, the United States and ...

... the United States and Environmental Policymaking By Leslie R. Alm and Ross E. Burkhart ... (3) the Joint Public ... Daniel Fi ri no, ...
Read more

Policymaking Through Advice and Consent: Treaty ...

... Policymaking Through Advice ... 3–31) and Lindsa y ... . 12 Conservatives are most inclined to oppose far-reaching international agreements, ...
Read more